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1] UTAH ZONING LAW 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Within ... zoning districts, the [local] legislative body may 
regulate and restrict the erection, construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and 
structures, and the use of land. 1 
A. The Acts 
5 
The Municipal Land Use Development and Management 
Ace (the "City Act") empowers cities and towns in Utah to 
divide or "zone" the territory within their boundaries into dis-
tricts and to regulate land uses therein. The County Land Use 
Development and Management Ace (the "County Act") similar-
ly empowers counties to zone the territory within their bound-
aries and to regulate land uses therein. Both of these acts 
(sometimes referred to hereinafter as "the acts" or "the en-
abling acts") were adopted in 19914 and amended in 1992.5 
They are the only comprehensive revision of Utah zoning en-
abling law to be enacted by the Utah State Legislature since 
the adoption of the first zoning enabling law for cities in 1925,6 
and the first zoning enabling law for counties in 1941.7 
B. Background 
Although zoning existed in the United States before the 
mid-1920s,8 it gained a measure of legitimacy during that peri-
od because of two events: (1) the promulgation and near univer-
sal adoption of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act; and, 
(2) the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 9 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-405(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-405(1)(b) (1991). 
2. !d. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003. 
3. !d. §§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (1991). 
4. Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, 1991 Utah Laws 873. 
5. Planning and Zoning Amendments, ch. 23, 1992 Utah Laws 181. 
6. Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, 1925 
Utah Laws 240 (repealed 1991). 
7. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah Laws 29 (repealed 
1991). 
8. 6 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
'II 867[1][a] (1993). 
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see 6 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 8, 'II 867[1][a]. 
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1. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce pub-
lished a model land-use enabling act entitled the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (Standard Act). 10 "By 1925, 19 
states had used the act in drafting state zoning enabling stat-
utes."11 In 1926, the Department issued a revised edition of 
the Standard Act, and by 1930 it was reported that the act 
"had been adopted as a whole or in part by 35 state legisla-
ture[s]."12 
Utah was caught up in the popular tide created by the 
Standard Act and in 1925 adopted its first enabling act for 
cities, 1a which was nearly identical to the Standard Act. 14 In 
1945, this enabling act for cities was substantially augmented 
by the adoption of a Municipal Planning Enabling Act. 15 
As noted above, a first enabling act for counties was not 
adopted until 1941.16 The language of this first zoning en-
abling act for counties was substantially different than the 
Standard Act. 17 
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 
The second event contributing to the legitimacy of zoning 
was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village 
of Euclid u. Ambler Realty Co. 18 Prior to Euclid, the constitu-
tionality of zoning had been suspect, but in that decision the 
Supreme Court affirmed that zoning was, in general, a proper 
exercise of governmental police power and not an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property.19 
10. 6 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 8, 'II 867[2][ii]. 
11. 4 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING § 2.21 (3d ed. 1986). 
12. !d. (quoting M. LOHMANN, PRINCIPLES OF CITY PLANNING 253 (1931)). 
13. Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, 1925 
Utah Laws 240 (repealed 1991). 
14. Compare Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, quoted tn 4 ANDERSON, 
supra note 11, § 2.21, with Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., 
ch. 119, § 7, 1925 Utah Laws 240, 242-44 (repealed 1991). 
15. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, 1945 Utah Laws 63 (repealed 
1991). 
16. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah Laws 29 (repealed 
1991). 
17. Compare Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, quoted in 4 ANDERSON, 
supra note 11, § 2.21, with Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah 
Laws 29 (repealed 1991). 
18. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
19. !d. at 368. 
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C. Review of Zoning Law and Proposed Changes 
Since Utah's adoption of the first enabling acts in 1925 
(cities and towns) and 1941 (counties), both enabling acts have 
been amended on a piecemeal basis, culminating in their com-
plete revision in 1991. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court 
and, more recently, the Utah Court of Appeals, have handed 
down over 70 decisions explaining how Utah zoning law should 
be applied. 
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to bring the 
current enabling acts and court decisions together into a gener-
al review of Utah zoning law; and, second, to propose changes 
in the enabling acts. In this article, separate reference is not 
made to "city" zoning law or "county" zoning law unless, in fact, 
a difference in the law exists. Each of the proposed changes is 
described under the heading, Proposed Legislative Change, with 
the proposed statutory modification language appearing in the 
footnotes. 
II. THE PLANNING COMMISSION 
The planning commission typically . . . has a major (and 
sometimes final) role in processing special-excep-
tions/conditional uses, in considering proposed subdivision 
maps and site plans, and in preparing general plans.20 
A. Creation of a Planning Commission 
A planning commission is created by the local legislative 
body and is required for the exercise of zoning powers.21 The 
statutory language governing the creation of a planning com-
mission is permissive.22 However, necessary functions like the 
creation of a general plan, recommending a zoning ordinance 
and amendments thereto, as well as recommending a subdivi-
sion ordinance and amendments thereto, cannot be accom-
plished without a planning commission.23 Therefore, a plan-
ning commission is necessary and not optional. 
20. ROBERT C. ElLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 214 
(1981). 
21. UTAH Com; ANN. §§ 10-9-201 (1992), 17-27-201 (1991). 
22. ld. §§ 10-9-201(1)(a), 17-27-201(1)(a)(i). 
23. I d. §§ 10-9-204(1), (2), (4), 17-27 -204(1), (2), (4). 
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Proposed Legislative Change. A planning commission is neces-
sary, and both acts are misleading where they provide that 
local units "may enad an ordinance establishing a planning 
commission."24 Both acts should be amended to provide that 
each city or county shall appoint a planning commission.25 
B. Commission Membership 
A city zoning ordinance establishes the number and terms 
of members, the mode of their appointment, procedures for 
filling vacancies, and removal of members from office. 26 This 
complete flexibility is not permitted in counties where the 
membership of a county planning commission is fixed by 
statute at seven members. 27 Each member of a county board 
serves a staggered three-year term.28 Subject to these limita-
tions, a county zoning ordinance prescribes the mode of ap-
pointment of commission members, their possible removal, and 
the filling of vacancies.29 Provisions in the former county en-
abling act which required a county commissioner to serve on a 
planning commission have been repealed.30 In both cities and 
counties, board members may be paid a per diem compensation 
and be reimbursed for expenses.31 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason to 
deny counties the flexibility permitted to cities regarding the 
number and terms of planning commission members. The 
county act should be amended to provide that a county zoning 
ordinance may define the number and terms of planning 
commission members. In addition, the city act should require 
staggered terms, as the county act does.32 
24. ld. §§ 10-9-201(1)(a), 17-27-201(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
25. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(1) and 17-27-201(1) should be 
amended to provide: 
(1)(a) Each municipality shall enact an ordinance establishing a planning 
commission. 
26. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-201(1)(b) (1992). 
27. Id. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(ii) (1991). 
28. ld. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(iii), (iv). 
29. Id. § 17-27-201(1)(b). 
30. Compare id. § 17-27-2 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning Revi-
sions, ch. 235, sec. 61, § 17-27-201, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 890. 
31. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(2) (1992), 17-27-201(2) (1991). 
32. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-201(1)(b){ii) should be amended to 
provide: 
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C. Organization and Procedure 
In cities and counties, general organizational details and 
procedures for a planning commission are established in the 
zoning ordinance.a3 Examples of these details and procedures 
are as follows: the election of a commission chairperson34 and 
his or her term of office (in counties, the chairperson is limited 
to a one-year term35); the election of a commission vice-chair-
person and his or her term of office36; the appointment of al-
ternate members, if any, and the mode of their appointmenta7; 
possible removal and the filling of vacancies38 ; the calling of 
meetingsa9 ; open meeting requirements40; and, the mainte-
nance and classification of planning commission records.41 
Proposed Legislative Change. No apparent reason exists to 
limit a county planning commission chair to a one-year term 
while allowing a city planning commission chairperson the 
flexibility to serve longer periods. The county act should be 
amended to repeal the provision that limits a county planning 
commission chairperson to a one-year term.42 
A planning commission may adopt its own policies and 
procedures.43 However, the zoning ordinance may require that 
those policies and procedures be approved by the particular 
legislative body before they take effect.44 
(1)(b)(ii) the number and terms of the members, who shall serve stag-
gered terms; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(iii) and (iv) should be repealed; and, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(ii) should be amended to provide: 
(1)(a)(ii) [The commission shall eonsist of se¥en mem13ers appointed by 
the ehief eJ£eet~tive effieer with the aElviee ana eonsent of the legislati¥e 
~] The ordinance shall define the number and terms of the members, 
who shall serve staggered terms. 
33. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-201(1)(b) (1991). 
34. !d. § 10-9-202(1). 
35. !d. § 17-27-202(1)(b) (1991). 
36. !d. § 10-9-201(1J(b)(iv) (1992). 
37. !d. 
38. !d. 
39. !d. § 10-9-202(2)(a). 
40. !d.; see infra text accompanying note 512. 
41. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-20l(l)(b)(iv), -202(2)(a) (1992). 
42. Specifically, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 17-27-202(1)(b) (1991) should be repealed. 
43. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-202(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-202(2)(a) (1991). 
44. !d. §§ 10-9-202(2)(b), 17-27 -202(2)(b). 
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Prior to 1991, the city and county enabling acts implied 
that planning commissions had contracting powers independent 
of the municipalities and counties they served. On that point, 
the Municipal Planning Enabling Act (adopted in 1945) provid-
ed that a city planning commission could "appoint ... employ-
ees and staff" and "contract with city planners and other con-
sultants."45 In addition, the original county enabling act 
(adopted in 1941) provided that a county planning commission 
"shall have the power and authority to employ experts and a 
staff."46 Both of these provisions were repealed in 1991Y It 
is now clear that the legislative body may control the "policies 
and procedures" of the planning commission. 48 
D. Meetings and Records 
A planning commission is a "public body" and therefore 
subject to open meetings requirements which, in general, re-
quire all meetings to be open to the public.49 But if the com-
mission is required to make a decision which is 'judicial" in na-
ture, the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Common 
Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service Commission50 allows the 
"decision making" phase of the meeting to be a closed meet-
ing.st 
The records of a planning commission are "public records" 
and thus generally subject to public inspection.52 However, it 
is possible that some information related to commercial53 or 
real estate transactions54 may be protected from public inspec-
tion. 
4fi. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, § 1, 194fi Utah Laws 63, 63 (re-
pealed 1991). 
46. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, § 3, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 29 
(repealed 1991). 
47. Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 23fi, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 877, 890. 
48. UTAH CoDF: ANN. §§ l0-9-202(2)(b) (1992), 17-27-202(2)(b) (1991). 
49. !d. § 52-4-3 (1989). Statutory exceptions to open meeting requirements are 
not normally applicable to the business of a planning commission. !d. § fi2-4-5(1)(a) 
(Supp. 1994). 
50. 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1979). 
51. For a discussion of opening meeting requirements in connection with a 
zoning board, see infra text accompanying note 512. 
52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-201 (1993). 
53. !d. § 63-2-304(2). 
54. !d. § 63-2-304(6), (7). 
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E. Powers and Duties 
A planning commission has eight enumerated powers and 
duties, most of which are controlled by the discretion of the 
legislative body. Those eight powers and duties are as follows: 
1. Prepare a general plan 
A planning commission is required to prepare a "general" 
plan (formerly called a "master" plan55) and subsequent 
amendments thereto.56 A general plan is a comprehensive 
planning document including "maps, plats, charts and descrip-
tive and explanatory matter"57 describing how the community 
proposes to meet its "present and future needs."58 The plan 
may address a broad range of health, safety, and general wel-
fare concerns,59 and may refer to territory which is not within 
the city.60 The county plan may include any part of the coun-
ty.BI 
A proposed general plan is adopted by the planning com-
mission after public notice and hearing.62 The plan adopted by 
the planning commission is then "recommended" or "forwarded" 
to the legislative body.63 Mter receiving the plan and after 
public hearings, the legislative body may modify and adopt the 
plan or reject it.64 Subsequent amendments follow the same 
procedure. 65 
The enabling acts do not explicitly require that a general 
plan be adopted before the text of the zoning ordinance is 
adopted. On that point a litigant in Gayland v. Salt Lake Coun-
ty66 asserted "that the Salt Lake County Commission cannot 
55. For cities, the "master" plan was introduced in 1945 in the Municipal 
Planning Enabling Act. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, § 2, 1945 Utah 
Laws 63, 63 (repealed 1991). For counties, the "master" plan was introduced in 
1941 in the original county enabling act. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 
§ 4, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 30 (repealed 1991). 
56. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(1), -301(1) (1992), 17-27-204(1) (1992), -
301(1) (Supp. 1994). 
fi7. I d. §§ 10-9-302(2) (1992), 17-27 -302(2) (Supp. 1994). 
58. I d. §§ 10-9-30 1(1)(a), 17-27 -301(1)(a). 
59. I d. §§ 10-9-301(2)(a), 17-27 -301(2)(a). 
60. ld. § 10-9-302(1)(b). 
61. ld. § 17-27-302(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
62. I d. §§ 10-9-303(1) (1992), 17-27 -303(1). 
63. ld. § 10-9-303(2), 17-27-303(2). 
64. I d. §§ 10-9-303(3)-(5), 17-27 -303(3)-(5). 
65. ld. §§ 10-9-304 (1992), 17-27-304 (1991). 
66. 358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961). 
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pass a valid zoning ordinance because it has not yet adopted a 
master plan."67 Although the enabling acts then in force re-
quired the adoption of a general or "master" plan, the Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed with the litigant, noting "that no-
where in the act is there any express requirement that a mas-
ter plan be adopted before zoning ordinances can be passed."68 
Proposed Legislative Change. A zoning ordinance is the specif-
ic implementation of the long-range forecast of a general plan. 
It is thus illogical to allow adoption of a zoning ordinance 
before adoption of a general plan. Both acts should be amend-
ed to require the adoption of a general plan to precede the 
adoption of a zoning ordinance.69 
The enabling statutes provide that a general plan, once 
adopted, is only "an advisory guide for land use decisions,"70 
even though the terms of the zoning ordinance may contain a 
provision "mandating compliance with the general plan."71 To 
mandate compliance with the general plan means that details 
of the text and map of the zoning ordinance must conform to 
the plans for community development described in the general 
plan. The positive side to mandating compliance is that zoning 
decisions may tend to be more consistent and far-sighted be-
cause they are based, as they must be, on the terms of the 
comprehensive general plan. The negative side to mandating 
compliance is that litigation may increase as litigants claim, 
wherever possible, that a zoning provision is invalid because it 
does not "comply" with the general plan. 
The explicit language in the enabling acts that a general 
plan is only an "advisory guide" lays to rest the conflicting 
signals sent by the Utah Supreme Court about whether a zon-
ing ordinance must comply with a general plan. The first of 
these signals is in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp.,72 where the 
reclassification of one-half of a city block from residential uses 
67. ld. at 635. 
68. ld. 
69. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404 and 17-27-404 (dealing with 
temporary zoning regulations) should be amended by adding a subsection (3) which 
would read as follows: 
(3) Except as provided above, adoption of a zoning ordinance shall be 
preceded by adoption of a general plan relating to the zoned property. 
70. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-303(6)(a) (1992), 17-27-303(6)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
71. ld. §§ 10-9-303(6)(b), 17-27-303(6)(b). 
72. 410 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1966). 
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to commercial uses was challenged on the grounds, inter alia, 
that the new classification did not conform to the city's compre-
hensive plan which was adopted in 1927.73 Tacitly acknowl-
edging that the plaintiff was factually correct, the Utah Su-
preme Court replied: 
It must be realized that zoning is not a static thing 
which once established becomes set in concrete forever. To 
require adherence to a plan formulated 40 years ago without 
any more reason than that the ordinance had been so long 
established would be quite impractical and in some instances 
would frustrate attempts to put into effect necessary changes 
to accomplish the objectives zoning was designed to serve. It 
is obvious that there must be some pliability so that in per-
forming its function the Commission may keep abreast of 
changing conditions as life courses onward and meets the 
varying needs of the growing city. 74 
However, in Wilson v. Manning/5 a case dealing with the 
use of referenda to rezone, the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, 
sent a second signal which suggested that an inconsistency 
between an ordinance and a master plan might nevertheless be 
a basis on which a local ordinance could be set aside: 
One way to make that showing [that an ordinance should be 
held invalid], under these authorities, is to demonstrate that 
the amendment runs counter to the terms of or the policy 
established in the underlying law or ordinance or the zoning 
master plan.16 
2. Recommend a zoning ordinance 
A "proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text 
of the zoning ordinance and maps . . . for zoning all or any part 
of the area" within a city or county is prepared by the planning 
commission and recommended to the legislative body. 77 
73. ld. 
74. ld. 
75. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). 
76. ld. at 254 (dicta) (emphasis added). 
77. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402(1) (1992), 17-27-402(1) (Supp. 1994); see also 
id. §§ 10-9-204(2) (1992), 17-27-204(2) (1991). 
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3. Administer provisions of the zoning ordinance 
A planning commission may "administer provisions of the 
zoning ordinance, where specifically provided for in the zoning 
ordinance."78 This provision recognizes the reality that in 
many, if not most, cities and counties, the planning commission 
and its staff handle most zoning administration. Zoning en-
forcement is one example of matters which the zoning ordi-
nance might expressly authorize a planning commission to 
administer. This express authorization to administer zoning 
matters legitimizes actions by a planning commission in formu-
lating an enforcement policy, supervising enforcement officers, 
and authorizing enforcement actions. 
4. Recommend subdivision regulations 
The acts provide that a city or county legislative body "may 
enact a subdivision ordinance."79 Where this is done, "[t]he 
planning commission shall . . . prepare and recommend ... 
[the] proposed subdivision ordinance to the legislative body."80 
The planning commission must hold a public hearing with 
respect to the proposed ordinance before recommending it to 
the legislative body.81 The same process is followed for amend-
ments to a subdivision ordinance.82 
5. Recommend approval or denial of subdivisions 
In cities and counties, a subdivision plat may not be re-
corded unless in relation to it "a recommendation has been 
received from the planning commission. "83 
6. Advise the legislative body 
"The planning commission shall ... advise the legislative 
body on matters as the legislative body directs."84 A simple il-
lustration of the manner in which this provision could have 
78. !d. §§ 10-9-204(3) (1992), 17-27 -204(3) (1991). 
79. ld. §§ 10-9-801, 17-27-801. For a dis<..'Ussion relating to subdivision ordi-
nances, see infra text accompanying note 306. 
80. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-802(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-802(1)(a) (Supp. 1994) 
(emphasis added); see also id. §§ 10-9-204(4) (1992), 17-27-204(4) (1991). 
81. ld. §§ 10-9-802(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-802(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
82. ld. §§ 10-9-803 (1992), 17-27-803 (1991). 
83. ld. §§ 10-9-805(1) (1992), 17-27-805(1) (Supp. 1994); see also id. §§ 10-9-
204(5) (1992), 17-27-204(5) (1991). 
84. !d. §§ 10-9-204(6) (1992), 17-27 -204(6) (1991). 
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been applied IS found in Citizen's Awareness Now v. 
Marakis. 85 In this controversy, the small community of East 
Carbon City was faced with a proposal to annex approximately 
2,500 acres of land which would be used as "a privately owned 
solid-waste disposal facility."86 Under its power to require ad-
vice from the planning commission, the legislative body of East 
Carbon City could have required its planning commission to 
give advice on whether this proposal should be approved, and, 
if so, under what terms. 
7. Hear and decide matters 
The acts provide that "[t]he planning commission shall ... 
hear or decide any matters that the legislative body designates, 
including the approval or denial of, or recommendations to 
approve or deny, conditional use permits."87 The power to hear 
and decide should be contrasted with the power to administer. 
The "hear and decide" language implies that a zoning ordi-
nance may empower a planning commission, in ways that go 
beyond simple administration, to receive public comment or 
evidence and exercise discretion in making a decision. For 
example, in Stucker v. Summit County,88 the local ordinance 
required a proposed use to be compatible with neighboring 
uses. Where compatibility was at issue, the ordinance then 
authorized the planning commission to hold hearings and make 
a decision resolving the issue: 
When a developer and affected property owners cannot reach 
a consensus of opinion regarding compatibility of the proposed 
land use, the Planning Commission holds a public hearing 
prior to making a decision and listens to the concerns of all 
affected property owners and interested parties regarding the 
proposed project's compatibility.89 
Examples of other matters in which a planning commission 
might be asked to exercise the power to "hear and decide" in-
clude nonconforming uses,90 historic building or district sta-
85. 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). 
86. ld. at 1119. 
87. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(7) (1992), 17-27-204(7) (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
88. 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
89. ld. at 285 (emphasis added). 
90. E.g., PRovo, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.04.020(4) (1992). 
16 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 9 
tus,91 planned community plan approvals,92 so-called "perfor-
mance development" evaluations,93 and, of course, conditional 
use permits. 94 
8. Exercise necessary and delegated powers 
The provision to exercise necessary and delegated powers 
is apparently intended to serve two functions. 95 First, the au-
thorization to exercise necessary powers helps avoid a strict or 
limiting construction of the enumerated powers described above 
for the planning commission. 96 Second, the authorization to 
exercise delegated powers accommodates the expanding tenden-
cy to delegate administrative responsibilities to planning com-
missions such as the responsibility to hold administrative hear-
ings.97 
F. Miscellaneous Powers 
The planning commission or its agents may enter upon 
land at reasonable times to make examinations or surveys.98 
In addition, a planning commission may have access to infor-
mation held by the state or any of its agencies, unless that 
information is protected.99 Cities and counties are entitled to 
receive available data, information and technical services from 
the state "without additional cost."100 
III. THE ZONING ORDINANCE 
The power to restrict and regulate the size and use of build-
ings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence and 
other purposes, is granted to the legislative body of cities [and 
91. E.g., id. § 14.02.100. 
92. E.g., id. § 14.04.020(3). 
93. Thurman v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1981); PROVO, UTAH, 
PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.31.050 (1992). 
94. E.g., PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.04.020(2) (1992). 
95. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(8) (1992), 17-27-204(8) (1991). 
96. E.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(statute on appeals to the courts strictly interpreted). 
97. Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). For a de-
scription in Stucker of administrative hearings, see supra text accompanying note 
88. 
98. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-205 (1992), 17-27-205 (Supp. 1994). 
99. ld. §§ 63-2-101 to -909 (1993) (Government Records Access and Manage-
ment Act). 
100. ld. §§ 10-9-203(2)(b) (1992), 17-27-203(2)(b) (1991). 
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counties] for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, 
morals and general welfare of the community .... 101 
A. The Power to Zone 
17 
A local legislative body may adopt and amend a zoning 
ordinance, 102 including both text and map. 103 Exercise of the 
power to zone is an exercise of police power. The Utah Supreme 
Court held in Marshall v. Salt Lake City 104 that it was the 
police power that enabled a city legislative body to divide a city 
into zoning districts and regulate uses therein. 105 That hold-
ing was reiterated in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of 
Logan,106 in which the Utah Supreme Court again stated that 
"[i]t is established that an owner of property holds it subject to 
zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a state's police pow-
er."to7 
B. Zoning Districts and Regulations 
The legislative body "may divide the territory over which 
[the city or county] has jurisdiction into zoning districts."108 
Within those districts "the legislative body may regulate and 
restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, re-
pair, or use of buildings and structures, and the use of 
land."109 Within each district "the regulations ... [must be] 
uniform for each class or kind of buildings ... [,] but the regu-
lations in one district may differ from those in other dis-
tricts."110 
In Hargraves v. Young, 111 it was held that the power to 
adopt regulations within zoning districts includes the power to 
designate sideyard and setback requirements. 112 By statute, 
101. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 92 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1939). 
102. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-401 to -403 (1992), 17-27-401 to -403 (Supp. 
1994). 
103. Id. §§ 10-9-402(1), 17-27-402(1). 
104. 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943). 
105. Id. at 707 ("[Dividing the city into zoning districts] is done under the 
police power."). 
106. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
107. Id. at 390. 
108. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-405(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-405(1)(a) (1991). 
109. !d. §§ 10-9-405(1)(b), 17-27 -405(1)(b). 
110. !d. §§ 10-9-405(2), 17-27 -405(2). 
111. 280 P.2d 974 (Utah 1955). 
112. Id. at 975. 
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the zoning regulations may "protect and ensure access to sun-
light for solar energy devices"113 and must include regulations 
permitting residential facilities for elderly and handicapped 
persons. 114 With respect to different uses in zoning districts, 
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City 115 held that the 
power of the legislative body to designate uses within zoning 
districts includes the power to differentiate and regulate dif-
ferent residential uses. 116 
In addition, the state's high court held in Buhler v. 
Stone 117 that regulations in a zoning ordinance may include 
"reasonable measures to minimize discordant, unsightly and 
offensive surroundings; and to preserve the beauty as well as 
the usefulness of the environment."118 Moreover, ordinance 
language requiring the elimination of "unsightly or deleterious 
objects" or ')unk [and] scrap metal"119 is not unconstitutional-
ly vague. In relation to vagueness, the court adopted a very 
broad view: 
Concerning the charge of vagueness, it should be realized 
that legislation must necessarily be in somewhat general 
terms because it is obviously impossible to describe in detail 
every act and circumstance a statute or ordinance is intended 
to deal with. It is but sensible and practical that courts 
should take into consideration the difficulties involved in 
describing such conditions with the last degree of precision of 
language. The pertinent parts of the ordinance should not be 
viewed in isolation for the purpose of finding fault with them 
and declaring it unconstitutional; they should be viewed in 
light of the total context and purpose; and an enactment 
should not be declared void for vagueness unless it is so defi-
cient that it is susceptible of no reasonable construction which 
would make it operable. 120 
113. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10·9-901 (1992). 
114. See infra text accompanying note 252. 
115. 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). 
116. ld. at 181. 
117. 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975). 
118. ld. at 294. 
119. Id. at 293. 
120. ld. at 294. 
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C. The Health, Safety, and General Welfare Standard 
The traditional standard of the health, safety, and general 
welfare of the public is the abstract measure of the police pow-
er by which local governments divide their territory into dis-
tricts and regulate therein. 121 Although conceptually, a zoning 
regulation is unenforceable if there is not a sufficient nexus 
between it and the health, safety, and general welfare of com-
munity residents, 122 the Utah Supreme Court has been ex-
plicitly reluctant to invalidate a zoning regulation for this rea-
son. This reluctance was first illustrated in Marshall in which 
the Utah Supreme Court signalled the lengths it would go to 
defend local zoning regulations from claims that no nexus ex-
ists.123 
In Marshall, the zoning ordinance permitted "utility" busi-
ness uses on intersection corners in residential districts. Ac-
knowledging that the enabling statute required that territory 
should be divided into districts and not regulated by single lots 
or groups of lots, 124 the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless up-
held the corner uses. 125 The basis for the holding was that 
the classification was part of a comprehensive plan designed to 
promote the general welfare, and the court would not second 
guess the city "[u]nless the action of [the governing body of the 
city] is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly 
offends some provision of the constitution or statute."126 
In Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City,127 a zon-
ing provision, which prohibited residences located more than 
600 feet from the University of Utah from use as a fraternity or 
a sorority, was challenged on the grounds that the requirement 
was discriminatory. Citing its decision in Marshall, the court 
refused to invalidate the provision and noted that the power to 
zone is a "discretionary power" with which the courts will not 
interfere "unless the discretion is abused."128 And, said the 
court in reference to the issue of discrimination, "[t]he selection 
of one method of solving the problem in preference to another 
121. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-102 (1992), 17-27-102 (Supp. 1994). 
122. See, e.g., Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 481 P.2d 559 
(Utah 1967). 
123. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah 1943). 
124. !d. at 708. 
125. !d. at 711. 
126. !d. at 709. 
127. 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). 
128. !d. at 179. 
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is entirely within the discretion of the commission; and does 
not, in and of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion."129 
Again, in Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 130 the Utah Su-
preme Court refused to invalidate a zoning requirement be-
cause of a claimed lack of nexus between a zoning provision 
and the public health, safety, and general welfare. 131 In 
Dowse, the plaintiff claimed his property should be classified as 
commercial and not residential. Disagreeing, the court respond-
ed that "[t]he wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number, 
nature, and boundaries of the district are matters which lie in 
the discretion of the City authorities, and only if their action is 
confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary may the court set 
aside their action."132 
The same result was reached in Hargraves v. Young. 133 
In Hargraves, a homeowner directly attacked the sideyard 
requirements of the Salt Lake City zoning ordinance claiming 
"that there is no reasonable relationship between prohibiting 
such structure in sideyards [referring to a carport which of-
fended the sideyard requirements] and the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or general welfare."134 Implicitly recognizing that 
health, safety, and general welfare was the correct standard, 
the Utah Supreme Court disagreed with the homeowner and 
held that the necessary nexus existed between that standard 
and the sideyard requirements. 135 
The one exception in this line of cases is Gibbons & Reed 
Co. v. North Salt Lake City/36 in which the Utah Supreme 
Court invalidated the rezoning of land being used as a gravel 
pit. The rezoning was from a forestry and natural resource 
zone to a residential zone and the court held that the rezoning 
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. 137 The 
court distinguished its earlier decisions in Marshall and Dowse 
on the factual grounds that the present rezoning "makes almost 
useless otherwise valuable land."138 Moreover, said the court, 
129. !d. at 181. 
130. 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953). 
131. !d. at 723. 
132. !d. at 724 (citing Marshall, 141 P.2d at 704). 
133. 280 P.2d 974 (Utah 1955). 
134. !d. at 974-75. 
135. !d. at 975. 
136. 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967). 
137. !d. at 563-64. 
138. !d. at 562. 
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the rezoning presented "no real gain to the public in general" 
because there was no substantial evidence that dust from the 
gravel pit was a nuisance. 139 
Two years later, however, the general reluctance of the 
Utah Supreme Court to invalidate a zoning requirement for 
lack of nexus with the public health, safety, or general welfare 
explicitly reappeared in Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County. 140 
In Chevron Oil, the Beaver County Commission refused to re-
zone property near the I-15 freeway from a grazing zone to a 
highway services zone for the reasons (1) that the county did 
not wish to provide government services at that location, and 
(2) that new businesses by the freeway would harm established 
businesses in Beaver City. 141 Citing its decision in Dowse, the 
Utah Supreme Court refused to invalidate the existing zone 
classification: 
Whether we agree with the wisdom of the county com-
missioners or do not agree with it is of no importance. The 
matter is to be decided by a legislative body (the county com-
mission), and the courts do not ordinarily interfere in such 
matters. However, should a board enact an ordinance which 
deprives a person of his property, and where it is clear that 
the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a discrimi-
nating manner, the courts will grant redress. 142 
Again in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated in dicta 
in Wilson v. Manning 143 the proposition that zoning provi-
sions which are irrationally connected to the health, safety, and 
general welfare of community residents may be invalidated by 
the courts. Thus, stated the Wilson court: "County and city 
zoning ordinances can be set aside in the courts if they are 
confiscatory, discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
without basis in reason."144 But the demonstrated reality is 
that the courts will respond in such cases only where the injus-
tice is obvious. This reality was summarized in the 1990 deci-
sion of the court of appeals in Sandy City v. Salt Lake Coun-
tyi45: 
139. ld. at 563. 
140. 449 P.2d 989 (Utah 1969). 
141. ld. at 990. 
142. ld. 
143. 6fi7 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). 
144. ld. at 254 (dicta). 
145. 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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It is well established in Utah that "courts of law cannot sub-
stitute their judgment in the area of zoning regulations for 
that of the [municipality's] governing body." Instead, the 
courts afford a comparatively wide latitude of discretion to 
administrative bodies charged with the responsibility of zon-
ing, as well as endowing their actions with a presumption of 
correctness and validity, because of the complexity of factors 
involved in the matter of zoning and the specialized knowl-
edge of the administrative body. Thus, the courts will not 
consider the wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise 
interfere with a zoning determination unless "it is shown that 
there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken."146 
D. "Spot" Zones 
The statutory requirement that the territory of a city or 
county must be divided into districts prohibits, by definition, 
the division of territory into smaller parts which are sometimes 
referred to as "spot" zones. 147 In Marshall v. Salt Lake 
City, 148 the Utah Supreme Court described this limitation in 
the following language: 
That the [enabling] statute contemplates a division and regu-
lation by districts, instead of regulation by single lots or small 
groups of lots, is evident. The regulation of the use of property 
by lots or by very small areas is not zoning and does violence 
to the purpose and provisions of the statute. 149 
In Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral 
Co., 150 the Utah Supreme Court described the consequences 
of spot zoning: 
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "is-
lands." One type results when the zoning authority improp-
erly limits the use which may be made of a small parcel locat-
ed in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type of 
"island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a 
limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in 
one or more spots in the district. 151 
146. ld. at 485-86 (citations omitted). 
147. See generally 83 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 146 (1992). 
148. 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943). 
149. Id. at 708 (second emphasis added). 
150. 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976). 
151. Id. at 1151. 
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Although seemingly clear in concept about the nature and 
consequences of spot zoning, the Utah Supreme Court has in 
practice deferred to the discretion of local legislative bod-
ies.152 The result is that the court has thus far been unwilling 
to acknowledge the existence of a prohibited "spot" zone, even 
when the zoning district is no bigger than the corner lots de-
scribed in Marshall. 
In cases other than Marshall, spot zone challenges have 
likewise been unsuccessful. In Naylor v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 153 a zoning reclassification of one half of a city block 
from residential to commercial was challenged on the grounds, 
inter alia, "that the rezoning of this one-half block area for 
business is in effect a 'spot' zoning inconsistent with the zoning 
of the surrounding area."154 Declining to substitute its 
judgment for that of the city commission, the court made no 
comment about the size of the new district and simply observed 
that the reclassification was consistent with changing circum-
stances.155 The city commission, the court said, "must neces-
sarily be allowed a wide latitude of discretion."156 
The result in Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n 157 
was similar. In this action a long-established business, operat-
ing as a nonconforming use in a residential zone, had substan-
tially expanded ("with annual gross receipts of more than 
$1,200,000 and occupying approximately 13 acres") beyond its 
original nonconforming status. 158 Rezoning of the property 
from residential to commercial was challenged and "[t]he trial 
court held that the reclassification ordinance constitutes spot 
zoning and that the action of the Board of County Commission-
ers was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious."159 The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[f]t is doubtful that the 
term 'spot zoning' applies to this case in view of the size of the 
tract."16° Citing, among others, its decisions in Marshall, 
Dowse and Naylor, the Supreme Court reiterated that zoning 
classifications "lie solely within [local legislative] discretion," 
152. See supra text accompanying note 146. 
153. 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966). 
154. ld. at 766. 
155. ld. 
156. ld. at 765. 
157. 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976). 
158. ld. at 1151. 
159. ld. 
160. ld. 
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and, in the absence of action which "is illegal, arbitrary, dis-
criminatory or capricious," that "[i]t is the policy of this court 
... that it will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the 
legislative body of the municipality."161 
Thus, the result with respect to spot zones is similar to the 
result with respect to the health, safety, and general welfare 
standard. Although the courts have stated in concept that a 
spot zone will be invalidated when challenged, the reality is 
that even in the most egregious case, the court refused to inval-
idate the claimed spot zone.162 
E. The Procedure to Zone 
A zoning ordinance (including text and maps) is prepared 
and recommended by the planning commission and adopted by 
the legislative body. 163 Thereafter, amendments may not be 
made to the zoning ordinance unless the proposal originated 
with the planning commission or was first referred to the plan-
ning commission "for its approval, disapproval, or recommenda-
tions."164 Curiously, although the planning commission is 
explicitly required to hold hearings in relation to the proposed 
general plan it recommends to the legislative body, it is not 
explicitly required to hold hearings in relation to the proposed 
zoning ordinance it recommends to the legislative body. 165 
Proposed Legislative Change. In an apparent oversight, the 
enabling acts do not expressly require the planning commis-
sion to hold a hearing on a proposed zoning ordinance before 
forwarding it to the legislative body. Both acts should be 
amended to expressly require such a hearing. 166 
161. ld. at 1152. 
162. See, e.g., Marshall, 141 P.2d at 707-11. 
163. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402 (1992), 17-27-402 (Supp. 1994). 
164. ld. §§ 10-9-403 (1992), 17-27-403 (1991). 
16fi. Compare id. §§ 10-9-303(1), 17-27-303(1) with id. §§ 10-9-402(1), 17-27-
402(1). 
166. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402 and 17-27-402 (preparation and 
adoption of zoning ordinance) should be amended as follows: the present subsection 
(2) of said sections should be renumbered as subsection (3) and the present sub-
section (3) of said sections should be renumbered as subsection (4). A new subsec-
tion (2) should be enacted which provides as follows: 
(2)(a) After completing a proposed zoning ordinance, the planning commis-
sion shall schedule and hold a public hearing on the proposed ordinance. 
(b) The planning commission shall provide reasonable notice of the public 
hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
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Preparing, amending and adopting a zoning ordinance 
requires that legislative bodies first conduct public hear-
ings.167 In Call v. City of West Jordan/68 the city adopted 
an impact fee pursuant to its power to enact subdivision ordi-
nances, but evidence showed that the city failed to conduct a 
required public hearing first. The city argued, however, that 
the public hearing requirement was satisfied "because the ordi-
nance was adopted at a regularly scheduled city council meet-
ing which was open to the public."169 The Utah Supreme 
Court disagreed and invalidated the impact fee ordinance: 
[W]e hold that because the statute calls for a public hearing 
our legislature contemplated something more than a regular 
city council meeting held, so far as the record here discloses, 
without specific advance notice to the public that the pro-
posed ordinance would be considered. Notice, to be effective, 
must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance 
that is finally adopted. Failure to strictly follow the statutory 
requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid. 170 
Both the city and county enabling acts mandate that public 
meetings held for the purpose of rezoning must be preceded by 
notice thereof to the public. 171 In this context it has been held 
that failure to give adequate public notice is a basis for invali-
dating an ordinance. For example, in Melville v. Salt Lake 
County, 172 the former county enabling statute required four 
public notices as a prerequisite to zoning an area for the first 
time, but only one notice was given. 173 Consequently, the or-
dinance applying a zoning classification was held invalid. 174 
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 175 the applicable statute 
required that notice of a rezoning be given by publication in a 
(c) After the public hearing, the planning commission may make changes 
to the proposed zoning ordinance. 
The proposed language is adapted from the notice and hearing provisions followed 
by a planning commission for a general plan. !d. §§ 10-9-303(1) (1992), 17-27-303(1) 
(Supp. 1994). 
167. !d. §§ 10-9-402(2), 17-27 -402(2). 
168. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
169. Id. at 188. 
170. !d. (citations omitted). 
171. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-403(2) (1992), 17-27-403(2) (Supp. 1994). 
172. 536 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975). 
173. !d. at 134. 
174. !d. 
175. 487 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968). 
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newspaper and "by posting in three public places designed to 
give notice thereof to the persons affected."176 The Utah Su-
preme Court invalidated the rezoning for lack of sufficient 
public notice, even though the literal requirements of the stat-
ute (one publication and three public postings) had arguably 
been met. The court was obviously influenced by the fact that 
the protestors had specially inquired about the rezoning and 
had been assured that it would not be adopted, and that there-
after, the applicant was personally notified of the rezoning 
hearing, but the protestors were not. 177 
F. Initiative I Referendum 
Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution explicitly 
authorizes the use of initiatives and referenda by voters "of any 
legal subdivision of the state." Article VI, section 1 provides 
that 
[voters] under such conditions and in such manner and within 
such time as may be provided by law, may initiate any de-
sired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to a vote 
of the people of said legal subdivision for approval or rejec-
tion, or may require any law or ordinance passed by the law 
making body of said legal subdivision to be submitted to the 
voters thereof before such law or ordinance shall take 
effect. 178 
In the context of local zoning legislation, the cases applying 
Article VI, section 1 and the related statutes179 are muddled. 
The seminal case is Keigley v. Bench, 180 a case not dealing 
with zoning, which held that some decisions, although cast in 
the form of a legislative act, are in substance an administrative 
decision. Following that analysis, the issuing of bonds to fi-
nance construction of a municipal electric plant and system 
was held in Keigley to be legislative in nature and subject to a 
referendum. 181 However, in Shriver v. Bench, 182 the setting 
176. ld. at 447 (emphasis added) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-17 (1958) 
(repealed 1983)). 
177. I d. at 445-46. 
178. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2) (emphasis added). 
179. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-7-401, -402 (Supp. 1994) ("Local Initiatives and 
Referenda--General Provisions"). 
180. 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939). 
181. ld. at 482-86. 
182. 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957). 
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of police officers' and firefighters' salaries was characterized as 
administrative in nature and thus not subject to a referen-
dum.183 
Falling chronologically between Keigley and Shriver was 
the first zoning case, Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co. 184 In 
Dewey, the plaintiff claimed that a residential rezoning ordi-
nance could be adopted through the initiative process. 185 His 
view was plausible because in Marshall v. Salt Lake City/86 
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity, 187 and Dowse, 188 the court 
clearly treated zoning decisions as legislative in nature. Howev-
er, the Dewey court would not allow an initiative to be used to 
make a zoning decision. 189 Discussing, but not explicitly 
adopting the legislative/administrative test from Keigley, the 
court noted that the zoning enabling statute required notice 
and hearing before the adoption of zoning legislation. The court 
held that, because the initiative process does not include notice 
and hearing, it cannot be used to rezone. 190 
Ten years after Dewey, the issue of zoning by initiative or 
referendum was renewed in Bird v. Sorenson 191 in which the 
plaintiffs demanded use of a referendum with respect to a re-
zoning. In Bird, the Utah Supreme Court issued a very brief 
opinion which made no reference to its decision in Dewey but 
simply cited Keigley and Shriver for the proposition that "[t]he 
determinative question is whether or not the action of the City 
Council was administrative or legislative."192 The court ig-
nored its holdings in Marshall, Phi Kappa Iota, and Dowse, 
which state that the process of zoning is a legislative func-
tion, 193 and held that rezoning was administrative and re-
fused the use of a referendum. In so holding, the Bird court 
183. !d. at 480. 
184. 277 P.2d 805 (Utah 1954). 
185. !d. at 806. 
186. 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943). 
187. Phi Kappa Iota Frat. v. Salt Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). 
188. Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953). 
189. Dewey, 277 P.2d at 809. 
190. !d. 
191. 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964). 
192. !d. at 808. 
193. Subsequent decisions not related to the initiative/referendum controversy 
continue to treat the process of zoning and rezoning as a legislative function. See 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d 989 (Utah 1969); Gibbons & Reed Co. 
v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967); Hargraves v. Young, 280 P.2d 
974 (Utah 1955); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
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admitted what may have been its real concem, which was "[i]f 
each change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a 
vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered 
inoperative."194 
The holding in Bird was followed 16 years later by Wilson 
v. Manning, 195 in which the plaintiffs demanded a referen-
dum with respect to their objection to the rezoning of ten acres 
of land from residential to commercial. In a 3-2 decision, based 
at least in part on stare decisis grounds, the Wilson court reaf-
firmed its holding in Bird that a rezoning should be classified 
as administrative, and, therefore, beyond the reach of the ini-
tiative/referendum statute. 196 Although offering no answer to 
the challenge of the minority opinion which asked how such an 
obviously legislative act like rezoning property could be 
recharacterized as an administrative act,197 the majority went 
on to hold out the possibility that major rezonings could never-
theless be done by referendum: 
This ruling does not mean that an amendment to a zon-
ing ordinance can never be the subject of a referendum. Some 
amendments can constitute such a material variation from 
the basic zoning law of the governmental unit as to consti-
tute, in effect, the making of a new law rather than merely, 
as this Court said in Bird u. Sorenson, "implementing the 
comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current condi-
tions."198 
The concession by the Wilson majority that rezonings 
which constitute a "material variation" to the local zoning plan 
could nevertheless be the subject of a referendum exposed the 
artificiality of the "legislative/administrative" test. If rezoning 
is genuinely administrative, as the majorities in Bird and Wil-
son hold, no amount of "material variation" to the local zoning 
plan will transform the inherently administrative process of 
rezoning back into a legislative process. 
At the bottom of these twistings and tumings is the policy 
judgment that it is not wise to trust all zoning decisions to the 
popular vote. This concem is openly discussed in the most 
194. Bird, 394 P.2d at 808. 
195. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). 
196. ld. at 253-54. 
197. ld. at 255. 
198. ld. at 254. 
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recent zoning case, Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis. 199 In 
Marakis, the trial court disallowed the use of a referendum to 
decide whether to annex approximately 2,500 acres of land into 
East Carbon City, in which it would be zoned for use as a pri-
vately owned solid waste facility. 200 The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed summary judgment in favor of the city and remanded 
with instructions which are essentially an elaboration of its 
holding in Wilson. 201 In sum, the Marakis court held that a 
referendum may be used to resolve a zoning issue if two re-
quirements related to voter participation are met. 202 
1. Material change requirement 
The first requirement for referendum use is the Wilson 
requirement,203 that the proposed zoning change amount to a 
material change of zoning policy as opposed to the continued 
administration of an existing policy.204 If, indeed, the pro-
posed change constitutes a material change in zoning policy, 
the proposal is characterized as' legislative,205 and, with re-
spect to this requirement, a referendum may be used. On the 
other hand, if the proposed change cannot be characterized as a 
material change in zoning policy, the proposal is characterized 
as administrative,206 and a referendum may not be used. 
2. Voter participation requirement 
The second requirement for referendum use is the question 
"whether the zoning change implicates a policy-making decision 
amenable to voter control."207 The Marakis court identified 
two instances where voters should not be allowed to alter zon-
ing legislation by the use of referenda. The first instance where 
voters should not participate is when "the zoning change in-
volve[s] a matter so complex that voters should be required to 
entrust the decision to their elected representatives"208; the 
second instance is where the use of referenda will interfere 
199. 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). 
200. !d. at 1119, 1121. 
201. !d. at 1121-24, 1126. 
202. !d. at 1117. 
203. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1982). 
204. Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124-25. 
205. !d. at 1125-26. 
206. !d. at 1125. 
207. ld. 
208. !d. 
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with the efficient operation of government.209 "Otherwise," 
said the court, "communities will be subject to the undesirable 
phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient 
and often arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal 
land development.'>21o 
Proposed Legislative Change. Whether voters should partici-
pate through initiative or referendum in the zoning process is 
a fair question for debate. However, the legisla-
tive/administrative test used to regulate the issue is flawed 
and should be replaced by statutory provisions which directly 
regulate the issue, as permitted by Article VI, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution.211 
G. Conditional Uses 
1. Conditional uses allowed 
Both acts expressly provide that "[a] zoning ordinance may 
contain provisions for conditional uses that may be allowed, 
allowed with conditions, or denied in designated zoning dis-
tricts, based on compliance with standards and criteria set 
forth in the zoning ordinance for those uses."212 Both acts de-
fine a conditional use; in summary form, it is a land use which 
is made compatible with surrounding uses by meeting certain 
conditions or requirements.213 
209. !d. 
210. !d. 
211. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-403 and 17-27-403 (dealing with 
amendments and rezonings) should be amended by adding a new subsection (3), as 
follows: 
(3) Neither an initiative nor a referendum shall be used to change any 
part of a zoning ordinance or a subdivision ordinance adopted pursuant to 
the authority of this act, unless the following conditions are met: 
(i) That the provisions at issue include a material change in zoning poli-
~ 
(ii) That the complexity of the issues involved in the proposed change is 
such that they may be easily understood by the average voter in the con-
text of an initiative or referendum. 
(iii) That the initiative or referendum process will not unreasonably 
interfere with the efficient operation of the governmental body. 
212. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407(1) (1992), 17-27-406(1) (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
213. !d. §§ 10-9-103(1)(c) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(c) (Supp. 1994). 
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2. "Point" systems 
The Utah Supreme Court has tacitly approved the use of a 
numerical evaluation system to help make conditional use 
decisions. In Thurston v. Cache County,214 a numerical evalu-
ation system was used as part of a conditional use approval 
process: 
The "numerical evaluation system" referred to assigns or 
denies points to the application according to certain criteria. 
Points are awarded for residential development which lies 
closer to pre-existing development and has roadway and utili-
ty access, and are deducted for intrusions upon prime farm 
land or other factors which would be of detriment to agricul-
ture. The evaluation system is advisory in nature, and not 
solely determinative of the disposition of any given applica-
tion.215 
3. Neighborhood approval 
Concerning the decision to grant or deny conditional use 
permits, the Utah Supreme Court has held that although it is 
appropriate to solicit information from neighboring landowners, 
it is inappropriate to base a zoning decision on their consent. 
Thus, in Thurston, it was alleged that the county "placed un-
due reliance on objections filed by landowners in the vicini-
ty."216 The Utah Supreme Court held the landowner's objec-
tions were properly treated by the county as advisory only. 
Moreover, the court maintained: 
[w]hile it is true that the consent of neighboring landowners 
may not be made a criterion for the issuance or denial or [sic] 
a conditional use permit, there is no impropriety in the solici-
tation of, or reliance upon, information which may be fur-
nished by other landowners in the vicinity of the subject prop-
erty at a public hearing.217 
However, in Davis County v. Clearfield City,218 the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed a district court holding that a "City 
Council's decision [refusing to grant a conditional use permit] 
214. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981). 
215. !d. at 443. 
216. !d. at 445. 
217. !d. 
218. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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was based on 'public clamor' which was not a legally sufficient 
basis for denying [a] permit."219 In a footnote, the court of ap-
peals explained the nature of the public clamor it found objec-
tionable: "The clamor is typified by the curious action taken at 
the Planning Commission hearing, where citizens in attendance 
were asked to vote on the application. Only one person voted 
for the facility and all others in the audience voted against 
it."220 
The issue of neighborhood involvement in permit approval 
arose again in Stucker v. Summit County. 221 The local zoning 
ordinance allowed neighbors affected by a proposed permit to 
express their opposition or support.222 Focusing on a distinc-
tion between "neighborhood veto power and neighborhood par-
ticipation,"223 the court of appeals observed: 
At no time during the proceedings did the Planning Com-
mission delegate veto power to the neighbors. Rather, it sim-
ply listened to the objections of the affected landowners and 
interested parties, and then rendered a decision. Therefore, 
because the Planning Commission ultimately made the deci-
sion to deny the permit, and because Thurston allows the 
Planning Commission to use information gathered from 
neighbors in making a decision, we hold that the 1985 Code's 
absolute policy on compatibility does not impermissibly grant 
veto power to the Stuckers' neighbors. 224 
H. Special Exceptions 
In addition to conditional uses, both enabling acts allow 
the local legislative body to "provide for special exceptions,"225 
a term which is not defined in either act. The acts also crypti-
cally provide that "[t]he legislative body may provide that con-
ditional use permits be treated as special exceptions in the 
zoning ordinance."226 
Most courts have held that there is no meaningful differ-
ence between a special exception and a conditional use permit. 
219. Id. at 711. 
220. Id. at 711 n.9. 
221. 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
222. Id. at 289-90. 
223. Id. at 289. 
224. ld. at 290. 
225. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-706(1)(a) (1992) (emphasis added). 
226. Id. §§ 10-9-706(3) (1992), 17-27-706(3) (1991). 
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"Different terms have been applied to ... special permits, spe-
cial exceptions and conditional uses, but the consensus of judi-
cial opinion is that they all refer to the same concept and are 
therefore interchangeable."227 In the words of another com-
mentator: ''The terms 'special permit,' 'special exception,' and 
'conditional use permit' are virtually synonymous."228 On that 
point, although it has not ruled directly on the issue, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Thurston was willing to assume, arguendo, 
that some "'special exceptions' are conditional use per-
mits."229 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no difference between 
"conditional use" and "special exception," and definitions m 
both acts should be amended to reflect that reality.230 
227. 6 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND UsE CONTROLS 44.01[ 1] (1992) 
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Lafayette College v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Easton, 588 
A.2d 1323, 1325 (Pa. 1991) ("A special exception is a conditionally permitted use, 
legislatively allowed where specific standards and conditions detailed in the ordi-
nance are met."); Fairhope v. Fairhope, fi67 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Ala. 1990) ("A spe-
cial exception is a conditionally permitted use ... ."); Urban Farms, Inc. v. Bor-
ough of Franklin Lakes, 431 A.2d 163, 167 (N.J. 1981) ("Rather, a special exception 
or conditional use is a permitted use, subject to specific special controls and condi-
tions."); Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1969) ("Provisions such 
as the one contained in defendant city's ordinance providing for special-use permits, 
sometimes called 'special exception permits' or 'conditional use permits,' were intro-
duced into zoning ordinances as flexibility devices."). 
228. Frank Schnidman & R. Lisle Baker, Planning for Platted Lands: Land 
Use Remedies {or Lot Sale Subdivisions, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 545 (1983) 
(emphasis added); see also 4 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
§ 19.01 (3d ed. 19R6) ("The 'special exception,' the 'special permit,' and the use 
permitted subject to administrative approval, are qualitatively the same."); Fred P. 
Bosselman, The Impact of the Douglas Commission of Local Planning, C851 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 433, 441 (1993) ("[T]he 'special exception' ... has now grown to include 
many types of discretionary decisions bearing such names as 'conditional uses' and 
'special-use permits.'"); W. G. Roeseler, Regulating Adult Entertainment Establish-
ments Under Conventional Zoning, 19 URB. LAW. 125, 134 (1987) ("Traditionally, 
zoning ordinances distinguish between uses permitted as of right and conditional 
uses, sometimes known as 'special exceptions' ... ."); Douglas A. Yanggen & Leslie 
Amrhein, Groundwater Quality Regulation: Existing Governmental Authority and 
Recommended Roles, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 54 (1989) ("Conditional uses ... 
are referred to as 'special exception uses' in many states' zoning enabling 
laws ... ."). 
229. Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 446-47 (Utah 1981). 
230. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-103(c) and 17-27-103(c) (definitions) should be 
amended to read as follows: 
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of its unique char-
acteristics or potential impact on the municipality, surrounding neighbors, 
or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas or may be 
compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or elimi-
nate the detrimental impacts. A conditional use is a type of special excep-
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I. Nonconforming Uses and Structures 
1. Nonconforming uses and structures generally 
A nonconforming use or structure is a use or structure 
which legally existed under prior zoning regulations but does 
not conform to present zoning regulations.231 A nonconform-
ing use or structure may be continued232 if it is not aban-
doned.233 It has been held that the burden of proving the ex-
istence of a nonconforming use falls on the person claiming 
it.234 
In general, the legislative body may provide for "the estab-
lishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance."235 
However, it is a common rule that nonconforming uses cannot 
be expanded and still retain their lawful status. 236 In that 
context, both acts provide that "[a] nonconforming use may be 
extended through the same building, provided no structural 
alteration of the building is proposed or made for the purpose 
of the extension."237 However, "the addition of a solar energy 
device to a building is not a structural alteration."238 
2. Termination of nonconforming uses 
In addition to the general power of government to termi-
nate a nonconforming use by consent or by eminent domain, a 
nonconforming use may be terminated "by providing a formula 
establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner 
can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use."239 Although there are no Utah cases fo-
cusing on the practice of terminating nonconforming uses by 
tion. 
231. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 10-9-103(1)0)-(k) (1992), 17-27-1030)-(k) (Supp. 1994). 
232. I d. §§ 10-9-408(1)(a), 17-27 -407(1)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
233. Morrison v. Horne, 363 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1961). 
234. ld. For a further discussion of nonconforming uses, see infra parts V.G, 
VI.J. 
235. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(2)(a), 17-27-407(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
236. E.g., Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah 1981) (finding that 
trial court did not err in holding that the defendant had unlawfully enlarged a 
nonconforming use). 
237. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(1)(1), 17-27-407(1)(1) (Supp. 1994). 
238. ld. §§ 10-9-408(1)(c), 17-27-407(1)(c). 
239. I d. §§ 10-9-408(2)(b), 17-27 -407(2)(b). 
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amortization, the courts generally hold that reasonable amorti-
zation periods for the termination of nonconforming uses are 
valid.240 However, if the nonconforming use is in a billboard, 
involuntary termination of the use may be accomplished only 
through gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent do-
main.24I 
J. Temporary Regulations (Moratoria) 
There is no provision in the acts for a moratorium on de-
velopment as such, but in the case of a "compelling, counter-
vailing public interest," the legislative body is permitted to 
adopt temporary zoning regulations without a public hear-
ing.242 These temporary regulations may operate as moratoria 
because they may, for up to six months,24a ''prohibit or regu-
late the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of 
any building or structure or subdivision approval."244 
The use of moratoria has been upheld generally.245 But 
exceptions exist where the development rights of a landowner 
have vested. In Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Lo-
gan,246 the Utah high court held that "an applicant is entitled 
to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed 
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the 
time of his application and if he proceeds with reasonable dili-
gence, absent a compelling, countervailing public interest."247 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that if 
240. See generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortiza-
tion Periods for Nonconforming Uses-Balancing the Private Interest and the Public 
Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 109 (1988); see also Art Neon 
Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 121 (lOth Cir. 1973) (holding rea-
sonable amortization scheme does not require payment of compensation); City of 
Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. App. 1954) (holding reasonable amorti-
zation of nonconforming uses valid and not a taking). But see PA Northwestern 
Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991) 
("[T]he amortization and discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use 
is per se confiscatory and violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution."). 
241. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(2)(b) and (c), 17-27-407(2)(b) and (c) (Supp. 
1994). 
242. ld. §§ 10-9-404(1) (1992), 17-27-404(1). 
243. [d. §§ 10-9-404(2), 17-27 -404(2). 
244. ld. § l0-9-404(l)(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 17-27-404(1)(b). 
245. See, e.g., Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963); 
Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 5 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1960). 
246. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
247. ld. at 396; see also Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (landowner's use rights did not vest with approval of subdivision plat). 
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zoning regulations "deny a landowner all use of his property," 
even temporarily, the landowner may have a cause of action for 
compensation. 248 
The use of temporary regulations may focus on fast-rising 
problems. That being so, it was probably intended that tempo-
rary regulations could be adopted without obtaining the recom-
mendation of a planning commission. But the enabling acts do 
not waive that recommendation249 and, indeed, are explicit 
that an amendment to the text or map of a zoning ordinance 
first requires referral to the planning commission. 250 
Proposed Legislative Change. It was probably intended that 
temporary regulations could be adopted without obtaining the 
recommendation of the planning commission. Both acts 
should thus be explicitly amended to provide. 251 
K. Residences for the Elderly and the Handicapped .. Generally 
1. Ordinances mu:~t be adopted 
The enabling acts provide special protection for residential 
facilities for the elderly and the handicapped. Implicit in this 
protection is the assumption that cities and counties, under 
pressure from antagonistic residents,252 may not voluntarily 
authorize the use of these facilities. Thus, the enabling acts 
provide that each city and county "shall adopt ordinances" that 
permit the use of facilities for the elderly and the handicapped 
which meet standards that are stated in or allowed by the 
enabling acts.253 In addition, if the zoning ordinance fails to 
248. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 804, 818 (1987) ("'Temporary' takings which ... deny a land-
owner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, 
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."). 
249. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404 (1992), 17-27-404 (Supp. 1994). 
2fi0. !d. §§ 10-9-408(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-408(1)(b) (1991). 
251. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404(l)(a) and 17-27-404(l)(a) should 
be amended to read as follows: 
(l)(a) The legislative body may, with[~] a public hearing but without a 
recommendation from the planning commission, enact ordinances estab-
lishing temporary zoning regulations for any part or all of the area with-
in the [municipality/county] if: 
252. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 797 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D. Utah 
1992) ("Disparaging comments [related to a facility for the handicapped were] alleg-
edly made by residents at ... public hearings."). 
258. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-502(1), -504(2) (1992), 17-27-502(1), -504(2) 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
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permit the facility use, the city or county must permit it on the 
authority of the enabling act.254 Moreover, the enabling acts 
require that city and county ordinances "shall prohibit discrimi-
nation against elderly persons [and handicapped persons255] 
and against residential facilities for elderly persons [and handi-
capped persons256]."257 
2. Review limited 
The enabling acts are explicit that, in deciding to grant or 
deny an application for a residential facility, a "[municipality/ 
county] may decide only whether or not the residential facility 
. . . conforms to ordinances adopted by the [municipali-
ty/county] under this part [which addresses residential facili-
ties]."258 Indeed, "[i]f the [municipality/county] determines 
that the residential facility ... complies with the ordinances, it 
shall grant the requested permit to that facility."259 
3. Elderly as a "family" 
Another statutory restriction on the ability of a city or 
county to limit the occupancy of residences by the elderly re-
lates to the definition of a family used in the city or county 
zoning ordinance. The enabling acts provide that "[t]he re-
quirements of this section [facilities in single-family districts] 
that a residential facility for elderly persons obtain a condi-
tional use permit or other permit do not apply if the facility 
meets the requirements of existing zoning ordinances that allow 
a specified number of unrelated persons to live together."260 
Thus, for example, in Provo City, a family is defined, inter alia, 
as "two or more persons all related by blood within five degrees 
of consanguinity, by marriage or adoption."261 Accordingly, if 
two elderly men choose to live in Provo City in a residence in a 
single-family district, they meet the "family" definition, and 
special qualifications related to their age status cannot be im-
posed. 
254. I d. §§ 10-9-503(3), 17-27 -503(3). 
255. ld. §§ 10-9-604(5), 17-27-604(5). 
256. ld. 
257. I d. §§ 10-9-504(5), 17-27 -504(5). 
258. I d. §§ 10-9-503(1)(a), 17-27 -503(1)(a). 
259. I d. §§ 10-9-503(1)(b), 17-27 -503(1)(b). 
260. ld. §§ 10-9-504(6), 17-27-504(6) (emphasis added). 
261. PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.06.020 (1993). 
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L. Residential Facilities for the Elderly 
1. The facility 
Residential facilities for the elderly have two components: 
the facility and the elderly residents who live in the facility. 
Focusing on the residence itself, four statutory standards must 
be met by all residential facilities for elderly persons: (1) the fa-
cility "may not operate as a business":l62; (2) the facility must 
"be owned by one of the residents or by an immediate family 
member of one of the residents or be a facility for which the 
title has been placed in trust for a resident"263; (3) the facility 
must "be consistent with existing zoning of the desired loca-
tion"264; and, (4) the facility must "be occupied on a 24-hour-
per-day basis by eight or fewer elderly persons in a family-type 
arrangement."265 
2. The facility as a permitted use 
In all zoning districts, residential facilities for elderly per-
sons must be a permitted use, except in zoning districts "zoned 
to permit exclusively single-family dwellings," where such facil-
ities may be a conditional use.266 If the proposed facility is a 
permitted use, meaning it is located in a zoning district which 
is not limited exclusively to single-family dwellings, the local 
zoning ordinance may only require compliance with the follow-
ing: (1) the facility must meet all applicable zoning, health, 
safety, and building codes267; (2) the facility must include "ad-
equate off-street parking space"268; (3) the facility must "be 
capable of use as a residential facility for elderly persons with-
out structural or landscaping alterations that would change the 
structure's residential character"269 ; and, ( 4) the facility may 
not "be established within three-quarters mile of another resi-
dential facility for elderly persons or residential facility for 
handicapped persons."270 
262. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-501(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-501(1)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
263. ld. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(i), 17-27-501(1)(b)(i). 
264. Id. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(ii), 17-27-501(1)(b)(ii). 
265. Id. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(iii), 17-27-501(1)(b)(iii). 
266. Compare id. §§ 10-9-502(1), 17-27-502(1) with id. §§ 10-9-504(2), 17-27-
504(2). 
267. ld. §§ 10-9-502(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-502(2)(a) (1991). 
268. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)(b), 17-27 -502(2)(b). 
269. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)(c), 17-27 -502(2)(c). 
270. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)(d), 17-27 -502(2)(d). 
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3. The facility as a conditional use 
On the other hand, if the facility will be located in a resi-
dential district which is limited exclusively to single-family 
dwellings, it may be classified as a conditional use instead of a 
permitted use. If the facility is allowed as a conditional use, the 
following apply: (1) the facility must meet all applicable zoning, 
health, safety and building codes271 ; (2) the facility must "be 
capable of use as a residential facility for elderly persons with-
out structural or landscaping alterations that would change the 
structure's residential character"272; (3) the facility must meet 
local criteria for such a residential facility for the elderly273; 
and (4) the facility may not "be established within three-quar-
ters mile of another residential facility for elderly persons or 
residential facility for handicapped persons."274 
4. The elderly resident 
The second component in residential facilities for the elder-
ly are the elderly themselves. An "elderly" person is a person 
"60 years old or older, who desires or needs to live with other 
elderly persons in a group setting, but who is capable of living 
independently."275 In all cases, whether the use is permitted 
or conditional, two additional qualifications for the elderly resi-
dents exist: (1) "no person being treated for alcoholism or drug 
abuse [may] be placed in a residential facility for elderly per-
sons"276; and, (2) "placement in a residential facility for elder-
ly persons [must] be on a strictly voluntary basis and not a 
part of, or in lieu of, confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment 
in a correctional facility."277 
M. Residential Facilities for Handicapped Persons 
1. The facility 
The statutory framework for residential facilities for the 
handicapped is similar in form to that for residential facilities 
271. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(a), 17-27 -504(2)(a). 
272. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(b), 17-27 -504(2)(b). 
273. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(c), 17-27 -504(2)(c). 
274. !d. §§ 10-9-504(3), 17-27 -504(3). 
275. !d. §§ 10-9-103(1)(e) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(e) (Supp. 1994). 
276. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)(e) (1992), 17-27-502(2)(e) (1991); see also id. §§ 10-9-
504(1)(a), 17-27-504(l)(a). 
277. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)([), -504(1)(b), 17-27-502(2)(0, -504(1)(b). 
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for the elderly. In relation to residential facilities for the handi-
capped, there are two components: the facility and the handi-
capped residents of the facility. Focusing first on the facility, 
four statutory standards must be met by all residential facili-
ties for the handicapped: (1) the facility must "be consistent 
with existing zoning of the desired location"278; (2) the facility 
must "be occupied on a 24-hour-per-day basis by eight or fewer 
handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement under the 
supervision of a house family or manager"279 ; (3) the facility 
must "conform to all applicable standards and requirements of 
the Department of Human Services"280; and, (4) the facility 
must "be operated by or operated under contract with [the 
Department of Human Services]."281 
2. The facility as a permitted use 
In all zoning districts, residential facilities for handicapped 
persons must be a permitted use, except in zoning districts 
"zoned to permit exclusively single-family dwellings,"282 
where such facilities may be a conditional use.283 If the pro-
posed facility is a permitted use, meaning it is located in a 
zoning district which is not limited exclusively to single-family 
dwellings, the local zoning ordinance may require compliance 
only with the following: (1) the facility must meet all applicable 
building, safety, and health codes284; (2) "the operator of the 
facility [must] provide assurances that the residents of the 
facility will be properly supervised on a 24-hour basis"285; (3) 
"the operator of the facility [must] establish a munici-
pal[!countyJ advisory committee through which all complaints 
and concerns of neighbors may be addressed"28"; ( 4) "the oper-
ator of the facility [must] provide adequate off-street parking 
space',.-.l87 ; (5) the facility must "be capable of use as a residen-
tial facility for handicapped persons without structural or land-
scaping alterations that would change the structure's residen-
278. !d. §§ 10-9-601(1), 17-27-601(1). 
279. !d. §§ 10-9-601(2)(a), 17-27 -601(2)(a). 
280. !d. §§ 10-9-601(2)(b), 17-27-601(2)(b). 
281. !d. §§ 10-9-601(2)(c), 17-27-601(2)(c). 
282. !d. §§ 10-9-602(1), 17-27-602(1). 
283. !d. §§ 10-9-604(2), 17-27-604(2). 
284. !d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(a), 17-27 -602(2)(a). 
285. !d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(b), 17-27-602(2)(b). 
286. !d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(c). 17-27 -602(2)(c). 
287. !d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(d), 17-27-602(2)(d). 
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tial character"288; and, ( 6) the facility may not "be established 
... within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for 
handicapped persons."289 
3. The facility as a conditional use 
On the other hand, if the facility will be located in a resi-
dential district which is limited exclusively to single-family 
dwellings, it may be classified as a conditional use instead of a 
permitted use. If the facility is allowed as a conditional use, the 
following apply: (1) the facility must meet all applicable health, 
safety, and building codes290; (2) the facility must be "capable 
of use as a residential facility for handicapped persons without 
structural or landscaping alterations that would change the 
structure's residential character"291 ; (3) the facility must meet 
local criteria for such a residential facility for the handi-
capped292; and, ( 4) the facility may not "be established ... 
within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for 
handicapped persons."293 
4. The handicapped resident 
The second component in residential facilities for the hand-
icapped are the handicapped themselves. A handicapped person 
is one who: 
(i) has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or 
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physi-
cal impairments, that is likely to continue indefinitely and 
that results in a substantial functional limitation in three or 
more of the following areas of major life activity: (A) self-care; 
(B) receptive and expressive language; (C) learning; (D) mobil-
ity; (E) self-direction; (F) capacity for independent living; and 
(G) economic self-sufficiency; and (ii) requires a combination 
or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic care, treat-
ment or other services that are individually planned and 
coordinated to allow the person to function in, and contribute 
to, a residential neighborhood.294 
288. ld. §§ 10-9-602(2)(e), 17-27 -602(2)(e). 
289. !d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(0, 17-27-602(2)(0. 
290. !d. §§ 10-9-604(2)(a), 17-27 -604(2)(a). 
291. !d. §§ 10-9-604(2)(1), 17-27-604(2)(1). 
292. !d. §§ 10-9-604(2)(c), 17-27 -604(2)(c). 
293. ld. §§ 10-9-604(3), 17-27-604(3). 
294. !d. § 10-9-10:3(1)(g) (1992); see also id. § 17-27 -103(1)(g) (Supp. 1994). 
42 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 9 
In all cases, whether the use is permitted or conditional, 
there are three additional qualifications directed at handi-
capped residents: (1) "no person being treated for alcoholism or 
drug abuse [may] be placed in a residential facility for handi-
capped persons"295; (2) "no person who is violent [may] be 
placed in a residential facility for handicapped persons"296 ; 
and, (3) "placement in a residential facility for handicapped 
persons [shall] be on a strictly voluntary basis and not a part 
of, or in lieu of, confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment in a 
correctional facility."297 
IV. SUBDIVISION REGULATION 
The legislative body of any [municipality/county] may enact a 
subdivision ordinance requiring that a subdivision plat com-
ply with the provisions of the subdivision ordinance and be 
approved as required by this part. 298 
A. Definition of a Subdivision 
In cities, a "subdivision" is comprehensively defined as any 
division of land into two or more lots or parcels.299 This same 
general definition is also used in counties, except that the fol-
lowing are not included as a subdivision: "a bona fide division 
or partition of agricultural land for agricultural purposes or of 
commercial, manufacturing, or industrial land for commercial, 
manufacturing, or industrial purposes."300 This difference in 
definitions means that, in cities, all divisions of land into two 
or more parcels are subject to the city subdivision ordinance, 
even if the land will be used for agricultural, commercial, man-
ufacturing, or industrial purposes; but, in counties, divisions of 
land into two or more parcels for agricultural, commercial, 
manufacturing or industrial purposes are not subject to the 
county subdivision ordinance. 
In counties, the exception from subdivision control for 
divisions of land, ostensibly for agricultural, commercial, manu-
facturing or industrial purposes, is problematic. For example, if 
295. ld. §§ 10-9-604(l)(a), -602(2)(g) (1992), 17-27-604(1)(a), -602(2)(g) (1991). 
296. ld. §§ 10-9-604(1)(b), -602(2)(h), 17-27-604(1)(b), -602(2)(h). 
297. I d. §§ 10-9-602(2)(i), -604(1)(c), 17-27 -602(2)(i), -604(1)(c). 
298. ld. §§ 10-9-801, 17-27-801. 
299. ld. §§ l0-9-103{1)(q) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(q) (Supp. 1994). 
300. ld. § 17-27-103(1)(q)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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the local zoning ordinance provides no further definition on 
what constitutes a "bona fide" division of land for agricultural 
purposes, zoning officials may be hard pressed to enforce any 
minimum acreage requirement.301 In addition, even when the 
zoning ordinance does provide a minimum acreage standard, 
those standards may vary widely. For example, a zoning regu-
lation described in Thurston v. Cache County302 imposed a 1 D-
acre minimum for agricultural parcels, while a zoning regula-
tion described in Morgan County v. Stephens303 imposed a 
100-acre minimum. 304 
A rational basis exists for exempting divisions of relatively 
large parcels of agricultural land from the control of county 
subdivision ordinances because continued use of land for genu-
inely agricultural purposes does not normally create new land 
use problems. But that is not true for commercial, manufac-
turing, industrial land, or agricultural land in relatively small 
parcels, because land divided for such purposes is likely to cre-
ate needs in relation to transportation, sewer, water, power, 
and the like. It follows that subdivisions of land which are 
likely to create such needs should be required to respond to the 
county zoning ordinance. 
Proposed Legislative Change. Divisions of land for commer-
cial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes, or into relatively 
small parcels for agricultural purposes will normally generate 
increased demands related to transportation, sewer, water, 
power, and the like. The county act should be amended to 
make such divisions of land subject to a county subdivision 
ordinance.305 
301. For example, as a legal advisor to county zoning officials, the author was 
asked for opinions describing how small certain parcels of land could be and still 
be for "bona fide agricultural purposes" if a division of land was for a "trout farm," 
or in another case, a "hydroponic farm." 
302. 626 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1981). 
303. 520 P.2d 1340, 1340 (Utah 1974). 
304. An issue raised but not resolved in Morgan County is whether the statu-
tory exemption from subdivision ordinance control of divisions of land for bona fide 
agricultural purposes preempted legislative attempts by a county to define the 
minimum size of bona fide agricultural parcels. Under the new county act, howev-
er, it may be argued that the provisions of§ 17-27-104(1) eliminate the preemption 
issue by expressly permitting the zoning ordinance to impose a stricter standard in 
the form of minimum parcel sizes. 
305. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-103(1)(q)(iii) (definitions) should be 
amended as follows: 
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include a bona fide division or partition of ag-
ricultural land for agricultural purposes [oF of eemmereial, manafaeturing, 
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B. Enactment of a Subdivision Ordinance 
A proposed subdivision ordinance is prepared by the plan-
ning commission, then recommended to and enacted by the 
legislative body.306 Each of those bodies must hold public 
hearings after giving public notice. 307 Amendments to the 
subdivision ordinance follow the same procedure.308 
C. Content of a Subdivision Ordinance 
Although both enabling acts empower city and county 
legislative bodies to enact a "subdivision ordinance," neither act 
mandates what such an ordinance shall or shall not include. In 
practice, however, a typical subdivision ordinance may include 
the following regulations: (1) subdividing procedures; (2) plat 
requirements; (3) street and easement requirements; (4) build-
ing lot requirements; (5) grading and slope requirements; and, 
(6) compliance with subdivision-related exactions.309 
A variety of exactions310 will often be included in, or as-
sociated with, a subdivision ordinance, consisting of connection 
fees,311 impact fees, 312 dedications of land,313 and fees in 
lieu of dedications of land,314 each of which is discussed be-
low. With regard to enforcement, this association of exactions 
with plat approval is a matter of administrative convenience 
because zoning ordinances may make compliance with the 
exactions a condition of plat approval. 31s 
eF iHaastFial laml ieF eemmeFeial, manufaettiFiHg, eF iHaustFial IJUFIJeses]. 
Provided, however, that a division or partition of land resulting in one or 
more parcels of land which is less than 25 acres in size is a subdivision. 
306. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402(1) (1992), 17-27-402(1) (Supp. 1994). 
307. ld. §§ 10-9-802, 17-27-802. 
308. I d. §§ 10-9-803(2) (1992), 17-27 -803(2) (1991). 
309. See, e.g., PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 15.01 (1993). 
310. See generally Michael J. Mazuran, Evolution of Real Estate Development 
Exactions in Utah, UTAH BAR J., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 11. 
311. See generally PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 10.03.250 (1993). 
312. See generally Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: 
The "Second Generation," 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990). 
313. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1979) (ordinance 
required subdividers to dedicate land or pay fees in lieu of dedications). 
314. ld. 
315. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-801 (1992), 17-27-801 (1991). 
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1. Connection fees 
The Utah courts have approved the collection of sewer and 
water connection fees as part of the process of approving subdi-
vision plats. Specifically, in Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo 
City,316 the Utah Supreme Court held that a city may charge 
a reasonable sewer connection fee for the purpose of enlarging 
and improving a sewer system. 317 In Banberry Development 
Corp. v. South Jordan City,318 payment of sewer and water 
connection fees was required as a condition to final subdivision 
plat approval. However, the court imposed a seven-part test to 
ensure that "newly developed properties" do not "bear more 
than their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to 
benefits conferred."319 Thus, in Patterson v. Alpine City,320 a 
connection fee schedule with incentives for early payment was 
invalidated because the incentive amounts were not reasonably 
connected to the cost of constructing, maintaining, and operat-
ing the subject sewer system.321 
2. Impact fees 
The Utah Supreme Court has validated the collection of 
impact fees through the subdivision approval process, so long 
as there is a relationship between the fees and the subdivision. 
In 1979 in Call v. City of West Jordan,322 the first of three 
opinions by the same name, the court approved as a valid exer-
cise of police power an exaction "which requires that 
subdividers dedicate 7 percent of the land to the city, or pay 
the equivalent of that value in cash, to be used for flood control 
and/or parks and recreation facilities."323 In the second of the 
three Call opinions,324 the court on rehearing augmented its 
first decision by requiring that the development must generate 
the needs on which the land/fee exaction is based and that, in 
316. 503 P.2d 451 (Utah 1972). 
317. ld.; see also Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (validat-
ing increased sewer fees to pay all capital costs of sewer system). 
318. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
319. Id. at 903; see Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982) (noting 
case remanded to take evidence ensuring compliance with the seven-part Banberry 
test). 
320. 663 P.2d 95 (Utah 1983). 
321. !d. at 97. 
322. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
323. !d. at 218. 
324. 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980). 
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response, the land/fee exaction must be used to benefit the 
subdivision. 325 
3. Dedications of land 
The first two Call decisions upheld subdivision related 
requirements for the payment of a fee or a dedication of land. 
Those decisions are thus a precedent for land dedications as a 
precondition to subdivision approval. However, a 1987 United 
States Supreme Court decision, Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission,326 emphasized, as do the Call decisions, that the 
dedication of land cannot be required unless there is a nexus 
between the required dedication and the burdens created by 
the proposed development. The holding in Nollan was reem-
phasized in Dolan v. City of Tigard,327 in which the nation's 
high Court stressed that there must be a "reasonable relation-
ship" between the nature and extent of the impact of the devel-
opment and the land dedication that was demanded.328 
D. Approval of Subdivision Plats 
A county recorder cannot "file or record" a subdivision plat 
until it has been approved by the city or county legislative body 
or by an official designated by ordinance. Neither the legisla-
tive body nor an official designated by the legislative body may 
approve a subdivision plat until the planning commission gives 
its recommendation.329 
1. Council-mayor form of government 
The rule above, that the legislative body may approve a 
subdivision plat, may not apply to cities operating under an op-
tional council-mayor form of govemment. This conclusion grows 
out of the decision of the court of appeals in Salt Lake County 
Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City. 330 In Sandy City, 
the issue was whether the municipal council (operating under a 
325. ld. at 1259. 
326. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
327. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994). 
328. ld. at 2319 (endorsing the "reasonable relationship" test of many state 
courts but declining to adopt the test formally because of semantics. "We think a 
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment."). 
329. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-805(1) (1992), 17-27-805 (Supp. 1994). 
330. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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council-mayor form of government) could authorize itself-and 
not the board of adjustment-to act as an appellate body with 
respect to conditional use permit approvals. On the face of 
things, it appeared that the municipal council could exercise 
that authority because the applicable statute provided that the 
board of adjustment would make such decisions, "unless the 
legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has designat-
ed another body as the appellate body for those matters."331 
But the court of appeals disagreed with the Sandy City 
procedure on separation of powers grounds. Citing Martindale 
v. Anderson,332 which held that the council-mayor form of 
government "is a true separation of powers form of govern-
ment,"333 and Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. ,3 :34 which 
held that "the authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly 
an executive function rather than a legislative one,"335 the 
court of appeals held that the municipal council could not au-
thorize itself to hear conditional use permit appeals.336 
The reasoning in Sandy City seems to apply to the approv-
al of subdivision plats. Although section 10-3-1219.5 provides 
that "the council [in a council-mayor form of government] shall, 
by ordinance, provide for the manner in which ... subdivisions 
... are approved, disapproved or otherwise regulated,"0:J7 it is 
nevertheless true, as held in Martindale v. Anderson, that the 
approval of subdivision plats is "a function of the executive 
branch."338 Thus, a municipal council, in an optional council-
mayor form of government, may provide for the manner in 
which subdivision plats will be approved, as long as it does not 
authorize itself to perform that function in violation of separa-
tion of powers principles. 
331. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8 (1953) (repealed 1991). This provision was re-
codified in 1991 in a slightly different form (not changing the substance of the 
provision). UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) (1992); see Salt Lake County Cottonwood 
Sanitary Dist., 879 P.2d at 1383 & n.5. 
332. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
333. !d. at 1027. 
334. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). 
335. !d. at 899. 
336. !d. at 901. 
337. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1219.5 (1992). 
338. Martindn.le, 581 P.2d at 1028 (emphasis added). 
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2. General principles 
Where the zoning ordinance gives the city council (in cities 
not operating under an optional council-mayor form of govern-
ment) the power to approve a subdivision plat, the Utah Su-
preme Court in Wright Development v. City of Wellsville339 
held that "approvals" by the city engineer and the planning 
commission are advisory only, and mandamus will not lie to 
compel the city council to approve a plat.340 Moreover, the 
courts will not interfere with the decision to approve or not to 
approve a subdivision plat "unless the determination made is 
in violation of substantial rights, or is so totally discordant to 
reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious 
and arbitrary."341 In addition, by statute the legislative body 
may refuse to approve a subdivision plan or plat that fails to 
make adequate provision for solar energy devices. 342 
3. Approvals 
The refusal to approve a subdivision plat cannot be capri-
cious or arbitrary. Utah's high court in Western Land Equities, 
Inc. v. City of Logan343 held that an applicant was entitled to 
a building permit or subdivision approval based on zoning 
existing at the time of the application unless there was a "com-
pelling, countervailing public interest" to the contrary, or un-
less at the time of the application the city or county had initiat-
ed zone changes.344 Once a subdivision plat has been ap-
proved, the court held in Wood v. North Salt Lake345 on due 
process grounds that a city cannot by ordinance unilaterally 
demand amendments to the plat and refuse to issue building 
permits until there is compliance with those amendments.346 
E. Amendment of Subdivision Plats 
The enabling acts provide a statutory mechanism by which 
an established subdivision plat may be amended for "good 
339. 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980). 
340. !d. at 233. 
341. !d. at 234. 
342. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-901(2) (1992). 
343. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). For a discussion of "vested" rights, see infra 
part V.M. 
344. Western Land Equities, 617 P.2d at 396. 
345. 390 P.2d 85R (Utah 1964). 
346. !d. at R60. 
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cause"347 after notice.348 This provision in the new enabling 
acts cures a problem under the old subdivision statutes which 
did not provide a practical mechanism for plat amendment.349 
The lack of a statutory amendment process may have been the 
cause of attempts, such as the one in Wood, 350 in which the 
city attempted to effectively "amend" a plat by ordinance and 
not by plat amendment procedures. 
F. Official Map 
Somewhat related to subdivision plats and exactions asso-
ciated with the approval and filing of subdivision plats is the 
"official map." An official map should not be confused with the 
map which accompanies the text of the zoning ordinance and 
shows the zoning classification (e.g., residential, commercial, 
industrial, etc.) which applies to land in a city or a county. 
Prior to 1991, the city and county enabling acts contem-
plated the adoption of an official map in addition to the adop-
tion of a master plan. 351 The official map showed the location 
of existing and future roads. Without a formal "taking'' (or the 
payment of compensation), the pre-1991 acts empowered a 
legislative body to place significant restraints on the develop-
ment of land over which it proposed to build a road. 352 The 
Utah State Legislature had this "official [road] map"353 in 
mind when it enacted both the city act and the county act in 
1991.354 
Keeping in mind the distinction between an official map 
and the zoning map, the code now provides that cities and 
counties "may not adopt an official map."355 Moreover, "[a]n 
official map adopted under the previous [city or county] en-
abling statute" cannot be used to compel a landowner to dedi-
cate land or to compel a city or county to acquire land.356 To 
347. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-810 (1992), 17-27-810 (1991). 
348. !d. §§ 10-9-809, 17-27-809. 
349. !d. § 57-5-7 (1953) (repealed 1991) (holding that the application to amend 
a subdivision plat required approval of all owners of land in the plat and the 
owners of land along streets associated with the plat). 
350. 390 P.2d 858, 858 (Utah 1964). 
351. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-23, 17-27-7 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
352. !d. 
353. Compare id. §§ 10-9-24, 17-27-7 (1953) (repealed 1991) with id. §§ 10-9-
306(2)(a) and (3) (1992), 17-27-306(2)(a) and (3) (Supp. 1994). 
354. !d. 
355. !d. §§ 10-9-306(1) (1992), 17-27-306(1) (Supp. 1994). 
356. !d. §§ 10-9-306(2)(a), 17-27 -306(2)(a). 
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avoid any misunderstanding, the 1991 enabling acts explicitly 
provide that "[a]n official map may not be used to unconstitu-
tionally prohibit the development of property designated for 
eventual use as a public street."357 
V. ZONING ENFORCEMENT 
A [municipality/county] or any owner of real estate within the 
[municipality/county J ... may, in addition to other remedies 
provided by law, institute ... injunctions, mandamus, abate-
ment, or any other appropriate actions ... [or] proceedings to 
prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, use, 
or act.358 
A. Government Enforcement 
Cities and counties may initiate civil actions to enforce the 
zoning enabling acts, and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto, 
"in addition to other remedies provided by law."359 These le-
gal actions may include the following remedies: (1) "injunctions, 
mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions"360 ; 
or, (2) "proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the 
unlawful building, use or act."361 
B. Injunction by Government 
Historically, a civil remedy commonly sought by cities and 
counties has been an injunction: Provo City v. Claudin362 was 
a successful claim for an injunction preventing the establish-
ment of a funeral home in a residential district; Clinton City v. 
Patterson363 was an unsuccessful claim for an injunction pre-
venting the use of land as a livestock feedlot; Morgan County v. 
Stephens364 was a successful claim for an injunction prevent-
ing the sale of unsubdivided land for nonagricultural purposes; 
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner365 was an unsuccessful claim 
357. ld. §§ 10-9-306(3), 17-27-306(3). 
358. I d. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a)(i), (ii) (1992), 17-27 -1002(1)(a)(i), (ii) (1991). 
359. ld. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a), 17-27-1002(1)(a). 
360. I d. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a)(i), 17-27 -l002(1)(a)(i). 
361. ld. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a)(ii), 17-27-1002(1)(a)(ii). 
362. 63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936). 
363. 433 P.2d 7 (Utah 1967). 
364. 520 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974). 
365. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976). 
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for a mandatory injunction compelling the removal of a carport; 
Fillrrwre City v. Reeve366 was an unsuccessful claim to abate 
and enjoin the keeping of pigs, cattle, and horses; Utah County 
v. Young367 was a successful claim to enjoin a commercial use 
in an agricultural district; and, Utah County v. Baxter368 was 
a successful claim for an injunction to prevent a commercial 
use in a noncommercial zone. 
In Baxter, the Utah Supreme Court explained the policy 
that allows a local government to obtain an injunction to pro-
hibit violation of its zoning laws: 
Generally, injunctive relief is available only when interven-
tion of a court of equity is essential to protect against "irrepa-
rable injury"; hence, where the remedy at law is adequate, an 
injunction will not lie. Under our zoning statute, however, 
injunctive relief is available as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution. This is based on the assumption that zoning 
offenses are inherently different from other violations of law, 
and that enforcement officers should be empowered to seek 
civil redress rather than to proceed in every case by criminal 
prosecution. 369 
In Baxter, the court quoted City of New Orleans v. Liberty 
Shop,370 explaining the public interests that an injunction is 
intended to protect: 
An injunction should not be issued to prevent the commission 
of a crime, if the only reason for preventing it is that it is a 
crime. However, if the wrong complained of is injurious to 
property interests or civil rights, or if it is a public nuisance, 
either in the opinion of the court or in virtue of a statute or 
an ordinance making it a nuisance, the fact that it is also a 
violation of a criminal statute or ordinance does not take 
away the authority of a court of civil jurisdiction to prevent 
the injury or abate the nuisance.371 
366. 571 P.2d 1816 (Utah 1977). 
367. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980). 
368. 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981). 
369. lei. at 64. 
370. 101 So. 798 (La. 1924). 
371. lei. at 798, quoted in Baxter, 635 P.2d at 64. 
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C. Presumption of Validity 
Administrative actions granting or denying permission to 
engage in a land use are presumed to be valid. In Cottonwood 
Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County,372 a county commission authorized construction of an 
apartment complex after having denied that permission to a 
previous owner. Sustaining the action of the county commis-
sion, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Due to the complexity of factors involved in the matter of 
zoning, as in other fields where courts review the actions of 
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that those 
charged with that responsibility (the Commission) have spe-
cialized knowledge in that field. Accordingly, they should be 
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion; and their 
actions endowed with a presumption of correctness and validi-
ty which the courts should not interfere with unless it is 
shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action 
taken.373 
Notwithstanding a general assumption of validity, an ac-
tion by government to enforce an ordinance may be defeated by 
a showing that adoption of the ordinance did not meet proce-
dural requirements.374 
D. Defenses 
If local government initiates legal action to enforce its 
zoning ordinance, the defendant may respond by raising a 
number of issues which, in a loose sense, may be classified as 
"defenses." The list of such defenses includes: (1) a claim that 
the zoning authority has lost the legal right to enforce its ordi-
nances because of simple delay, which may be incorporated in a 
formal claim of laches375 ; (2) a claim that the zoning authori-
ty has engaged in an act or omission which estops it from en-
forcing its zoning ordinance376; or, (3) a claim that the subject 
use is a lawful nonconforming use. 377 
372. 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979). 
373. ld. at 140. 
374. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) ("Failure to 
strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it in-
valid."). 
375. See discussion infra part V.E. 
376. See discussion infra part V.F. 
377. See discussion infra part V.G. 
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E. Inaction I Laches 
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake County v. 
Kartchner378 held that "[o]rdinarily a municipality is not pre-
cluded from enforcing its zoning regulations, when its officers 
have remained inactive in the face of ... violations."379 How-
ever, in Kartchner, inaction nevertheless precluded a county 
from enforcing a setback requirement where its inaction in 
relation to several other homeowners had become discriminato-
ry.380 Later, the court in Provo City v. Hansen381 held it was 
permissible for a city or county to use a complaint system in 
which an enforcement action is initiated when prompted by a 
citizen complaint, so long as the result is not discriminato-
ry.382 If the defendant claims laches, the court in Baxter 
maintained, "laches is a defense which must be affirmatively 
pleaded."383 
F. Estoppel 
Estoppel is a defense sometimes raised by a defendant in 
an attempt to prevent a city or county from enforcing its zoning 
ordinance. In six cases the Utah courts have commented on the 
use of estoppel in opposition to a zoning enforcement action. 
1. Estoppel cases 
In Morrison v. Horne, 384 the plaintiff claimed the right to 
construct a service station in a residential district, in part be-
cause the county assessor had incorrectly "listed and assessed 
it as commercial property."385 Refusing the plaintiff's estoppel 
claim, the Utah Supreme Court outlined its philosophy with 
respect to such claims: 
As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable and unrealistic 
to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no 
authority to do so, could bind the county to a variation of a 
378. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976). 
379. !d. at 138. 
380. !d. at 140. 
381. 585 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). 
382. !d. at 462. 
383. Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981). The court reiterat-
ed, "[t]he defense was never asserted in defendant's answer nor at trial, and hence, 
we do not address it on appeal." !d. 
384. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961). 
385. !d. at 1113. 
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zoning ordinance duly passed, to which everyone has notice 
by its passage and publication, because a ministerial 
employee erred in characterizing the type of property. 386 
Nevertheless, in Salt Lake County v. Kartchner,387 the 
Utah Supreme Court approved the use of estoppel under cir-
cumstances where a carport was ten feet in violation of a 30-
foot front yard setback. Noting "at least six similar violations of 
the setback ordinance within the vicinity of defendant's proper-
ty,''ass the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
held the county was estopped from enforcing the setback be-
cause of "[t]he discriminatory manner in which the ordinance 
has been enforced."389 But shortly thereafter, in Provo City v. 
Hansen,390 the court was faced with a law student who rented 
his house to as many as eleven other single students in viola-
tion of occupancy requirements. The student claimed he was 
justified under Kartchner because other unresolved occupancy 
violations existed in the vicinity. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that "no discriminatory enforcement" had been proved by the 
defendant because "the record is clear that a zoning violation 
complaint triggered enforcement action in every case discussed 
at trial."391 
In Utah County v. Young,392 the trial court granted an 
injunction preventing the defendant from conducting a commer-
cial auction business in an agricultural zone. The defendant 
cited Kartchner and claimed that the county was estopped 
because the county building inspector, noting plumbing and 
wiring suitable for a commercial building, did not warn the 
defendant that a commercial use would be unlawful in his new 
building.39a Contrary to the defendant's position, an advisory 
jury found that the defendant knew, when he obtained his 
building permit, that current zoning prohibited commercial 
uses.394 The court concluded that the defendant acted with 
knowledge of the zoning restrictions and was not misled by the 
building inspector, and "as a matter of law, estoppel may not 
3R6. !d. at 1114. 
387. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976). 
3R8. !d. at 140. 
389. !d. 
390. 5R5 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). 
391. !d. at 463. 
392. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980). 
393. !d. at 1266. 
394. !d. 
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be used as [a] defense by one who has acted fraudulently, or in 
bad faith, or with knowledge."395 
In Utah County v. Baxter,396 the defendant expanded a 
nonconforming use from one building to two buildings and 
thereafter claimed that the county had acquiesced in her action 
by issuing certain permits. The record was ambiguous about 
the extent to which county personnel knew of the expanded 
uses, but the court nevertheless denied the claim of estoppel 
because the defendant admitted she had "[not] been misled by 
the county or its employees."397 
In Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.,398 the defendant 
claimed, inter alia, that Alta was estopped from enforcing a 
single-family residential classification which would prohibit its 
commercial lodging operation. On three occasions after con-
struction of the subject residence, the town clerk erroneously 
issued the defendant a business license to operate a "lodging 
facility," and it was this conduct that was the basis of the es-
toppel claim.399 However, factually, it was clear that the resi-
dence was constructed before the business licenses were issued, 
so the court of appeals concluded the defendant "[had] shown 
neither an act or omission by Alta justifying good faith reliance 
nor a substantial detrimental change in [defendant's) position 
in reliance on Alta's acts."400 Moreover, "failure to enforce 
zoning for a time does not forfeit the power to enforce."401 
2. Estoppel principles 
In the aforementioned estoppel claims, only Kartchner was 
successful. But the decision in that case may be limited to its 
facts because the opinion does not articulate its controlling 
principles. Indeed, since Kartchner, Utah's high court has been 
unwilling to recognize a similar situation even though, under 
similar facts, it had the chance two years later in Hansen. 
Instead, the court has established criteria for an estoppel claim 
which make it debatable whether Kartchner will be repeated. 
395. !d. at 1267. 
396. 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981). 
397. !d. at 65. 
398. 836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
399. !d. at 800. 
400. !d. at 803. 
401. !d. 
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The following discussion delineates the controlling principles 
established by the court. 
a. Exceptional circumstances. "Estoppel, waiver or 
laches ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for in-
junctive relief against alleged violations of the zoning laws, 
unless the circumstances are exceptional. "402 
b. Act or omission. To invoke estoppel there must be 
"an act or omission upon which [the defendant] could rely in 
good faith in making substantial changes in position or incur-
ring extensive expenses."403 
c. An act. If the claimed estoppel is based upon 
reliance on an affirmative act by the zoning authority, "[ t]he 
action ... must be of a clear, definite and affirmative na-
ture."404 
d. An omission. If the claimed estoppel is based 
upon reliance on an omission by the zoning authority, "omis-
sion means a negligent or culpable omission where the party 
failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will 
not operate to work an estoppel."405 
e. Reliance. "The focus of zoning estoppel is primari-
ly upon the conduct and interests of the property owner. The 
main inquiry is whether there has been substantial reliance by 
the owner on governmental actions."406 In the context of reli-
ance: (a) the claiming party "has a duty to inquire and confer 
with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of the prop-
erty that would be permitted"407; and, (b) "as a matter of law, 
estoppel may not be used as [a] defense by one who has acted 
fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowledge."408 
402. 8A EUGENE McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 21i.349 (rev. vol. 
1965), quoted in Kartchner, li52 P.2d at 138; see also Ben Hame Corp., 8:36 P.2d at 
803; Young, 615 P.2d at 1267 ("In Kartchner, this court ruled that. under exception-
al circumstances, estoppel, waiver, or laches may constitute a defense to a suit for 
relief against alleged violations of zoning laws.") 
403. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d at 803; Younp, 615 P.2d at 1267. 
404. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267; see also Ben Harne Corp., R36 P.2d at 803. 
405. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267-68; see also Ben Harne Corp., 836 P.2d at R03. 
406. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 
1980) (emphasis added). 
407. Young, 615 P.2d at 1268. 
408. !d. at 1267. 
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G. Nonconforming Use 
In a zoning enforcement action a defendant may defend by 
claiming that his or her use may continue as a lawful noncon-
forming use.409 The Utah Supreme Court held in Morrison v. 
Horne410 that this burden is on the claimant.411 But if the 
claimant succeeds in proving the existence of the nonconform-
ing use, the court held in Fillmore City v. Reeve412 that "when 
the non-conforming use is established, the burden of proof is re-
versed. It is then on the city to prove that the defendant violat-
ed the zoning ordinance by exceeding his established non-con-
forming use."413 
H. Private Actions 
In contrast to civil enforcement actions brought by cities 
and counties, there are more than thirty reported Utah cases in 
which private parties have brought suit against government or 
other private parties in relation to zoning issues. The enabling 
acts expressly empower cities and counties to withhold building 
permits as a means of enforcing their zoning ordinances.414 
Historically, the exercise of this power has meant that the 
remedy most commonly sought by private plaintiffs is a writ of 
mandamus.415 By means of this remedy, private parties have 
sought court orders compelling government officials to issue 
building permits,416 approve subdivision plats,417 or approve 
conditional use permits.418 
409. For a further discussion of nonconforming uses, see supra part III.I; infra 
part VI.J. 
410. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961). 
411. ld. at 1114; see also Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah 
1977); State v. Holt's Estate, 381 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1963) ("In that case [Morri· 
son v. Horne], we determined that the burden of proving the right to a non-con-
forming use of property ... was on the property owner."). 
412. 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977). 
413. ld. at 1318. 
414. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(2) (1992), 17-27-1002(2) (1991). 
415. See discussion infra part V.I. 
416. See discussion infra part V.I. 
417. See discussion infra part V.I. 
41R. See discussion infra part V.I. 
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I. Mandamus 
1. Mandamus cases 
Utah's courts have handed down several decisions in which 
private parties have attempted to employ a writ of mandamus: 
in Morrison v. Horne,419 the Utah Supreme Court refused 
mandamus to issue a building permit for a service station be-
cause a claimed nonconforming use could not be proved; in 
Wood v. North Salt Lake,420 mandamus compelling the issu-
ance of a building permit was granted in the face of a city de-
mand that an existing subdivision plat should be amended; in 
Crist v. Mapleton City,421 mandamus to issue a building per-
mit was refused because the correct remedy was an appeal 
(and not mandamus); in Crist v. Bishop,422 mandamus com-
pelled the issuance of a permit on the grounds that use of the 
word "school" in the zoning ordinance text included a residen-
tial school for troubled boys; in Herr v. Salt Lake County,423 
mandamus compelled the issuance of a conditional use permit 
because the county commission did not act to reverse a decision 
of the planning commission within the time provided in the 
zoning ordinance; in Seal v. Mapleton City,424 mandamus 
compelling the approval of a proposed subdivision plat was 
refused because the decision was within the reasonable discre-
tion of the city; and, in Wright Development, Inc. v. City of 
Wellsville,42s a developer was likewise refused mandamus 
compelling approval of a proposed subdivision plat because that 
decision was within the reasonable discretion of the city. 
Additionally, in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Lo-
gan,426 the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an or-
der requiring Logan to approve a subdivision plat because its 
right thereto had vested; in Levie v. Sevier County,427 a subdi-
vider was refused mandamus compelling the approval of a 
subdivision plat because he failed to exhaust his administrative 
419. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961). 
420. 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964). 
421. 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). 
422. 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974). 
423. 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974). 
424. 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
425. 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980). 
426. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
427. 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980). 
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remedies; in Thurston u. Cache County,428 mandamus compel-
ling the approval of a conditional use permit was refused be-
cause the matter was within the discretion of the county plan-
ning commission; in Wilson u. Manning,429 mandamus to com-
pel application of the initiative process to rezoning ordinances 
was denied; in Merrihew u. Salt Lake County Planning and 
Zoning Commission,430 an order of the trial court granting 
mandamus compelling the issuance of a building permit was 
reversed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies; in Hatch u. Utah County Planning De-
partment,431 extraordinary relief compelling the issuance of a 
building permit was likewise refused because the plaintiff had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; in Scherbel u. 
Salt Lake City Corp.,432 mandamus to approve a condomini-
um project was refused because the board of adjustment (in a 
council-mayor form of government) did not make the final ad-
ministrative decision to deny the project; in Davis County u. 
Clearfield City,433 an extraordinary writ (mandamus) was is-
sued, compelling the approval of a conditional use permit which 
the city had arbitrarily and capriciously denied; and in Salt 
Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District u. Sandy City,434 
an extraordinary writ (mandamus) was granted to compel the 
issuance of a conditional use permit because the city council (in 
a council-mayor form of government) improperly reserved to 
itself the power to hear conditional use appeals. 
2. Mandamus principles 
The holdings in the foregoing mandamus actions may be 
summarized as follows: 
a. Mandamus as a substitute for an ap-
peal. Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for an ap-
peal; moreover, if mandamus is improperly substituted for an 
appeal,435 the action will be dismissed for failure to exhaust 
428. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981). 
429. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982). 
430. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983). 
431. 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984). 
432. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). 
433. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
434. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
435. See generally Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah 1988); 
Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). For a further discussion of man-
damus as a substitute for an appeal, see infra part VII.G. 
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administrative remedies.436 On the other hand, nothing in 
these holdings prevents the use of mandamus, in association 
with an appeal, for the purpose of compelling official action if 
an appeal is resolved in favor of the appellant.437 
b. Mandamus versus local discretion. The courts will 
not substitute their judgment for that of government officials 
and compel the approval of building permits, subdivision plats, 
or conditional use permits, so long as there is a reasonable 
factual basis for the local decision.438 But if there is not a rea-
sonable factual basis for the local decision, or if it is based on 
unacceptable criteria, the courts will use mandamus to compel 
the correct action.439 
c. Mandamus to compel an initiative or referen-
dum. With certain exceptions, mandamus will not issue to 
compel use of the initiative process m relation to a 
rezoning. 440 
d. Mandamus to follow local procedure. Local gov-
ernments must obey the procedural requirements of their own 
zoning ordinance, and mandamus may issue to correct official 
conduct in violation thereof.441 
J. Injunction by Private Party 
In contrast to the remedy of mandamus, which is used to 
compel public officials to perform nondiscretionary functions, 
the remedy of injunction has been used by private parties to 
prevent action by other private parties. In some instances, the 
remedy of injunction has been used to prevent public officials 
from performing unlawful acts. 
436. See generally Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't, 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 
1984); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 
(Utah 1983); Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974). 
437. The only objection to mandamus in the context of zoning administration 
is its use as a substitute for an appeal. E.g., Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 
634 (Utah 1972). Absent that flaw-substituting mandamus for an appeal-nothing 
in the reported cases precludes the use of mandamus. E.g., Hatch, 68fi P.2d at 
550. 
438. See generally Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981); 
Wright Dev. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980); Seal v. Mapleton 
City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
439. See generally Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964); Davis 
County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
440. See supra text accompanying note 178 for a discussion related to the use 
of initiatives and referenda. 
441. See generally Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); Wood 
v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964). 
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1. Injunction cases 
In Benjamin v. Lietz,442 the Utah Supreme Court issued 
an injunction to prevent a nuisance (the operation of a sawmill 
at unreasonable times), even though the sawmill operation clid 
not violate zoning regulations; in Judkins v. Fronk,443 an in-
junction prevented the construction of a service station, not-
withstancling the Ogden City Board of Commissioners had 
granted a builcling permit; in Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows 
Co.,444 an injunction preventing the construction of a mobile 
trailer park was refused on the grounds that the plaintiffs had 
failed to exercise their administrative remedies; and, in 
Swenson v. Salt Lake Cit:> ,445 an injunction was granted pre-
venting enforcement of an order of the board of adjustment 
that a carport be removed. 
Additionally, in Tolman v. Salt Lake County,446 a tempo-
rary injunction was granted preventing the enforcement of a 
rezoning because of defects in giving proper public notice; in 
Padjen v. Shipley,447 an injunction preventing the keeping of 
dogs in a pen or run was refused because the same was not 
prohibited by the zoning ordinance; in Call v. City of West Jor-
dan,448 subdividers were refused injunctive relief protecting 
them from the terms of a subclivision orclinance which required 
them to donate land or money to the city as a condition of pro-
ject approval; in Harris v. Springville City,449 an injunction 
was granted preventing a commercial operation in a residential 
district; and, in Chambers v. Smithfield City,450 an injunction 
was granted prohibiting the exercise of a variance granted by 
the city for which the applicant was not qualified. 
2. Injunction principles 
The holdings in the foregoing injunction actions may be 
summarized as follows: 
442. 211 P.2d 449 (Utah 1949). 
443. 234 P.2d 849 (Utah 1951). 
444. 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964). 
445. 398 P.2d 879 (Utah 1965). 
446. 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968). 
447. 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976). 
448. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
449. 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984). 
450. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). 
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a. Injunction by a private party against a private 
party. A private party having standing451 may obtain an in-
junction preventing another private party from acting in vio-
lation of a zoning ordinance.452 
b. Injunction as a substitute for an ap-
peal. Injunctive relief may not be used as a substitute for an 
appeal; and, if injunctive relief is improperly substituted for an 
appeal, the action will be dismissed for failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies.453 On the other hand, nothing in these 
holdings precludes the use of injunctive relief, in association 
with an appeal, for the purpose of preventing violation of a 
zoning ordinance if an appeal is resolved in favor of the appel-
lant. 
c. Injunction to prevent enforcement. An injunction 
may be used to prevent incorrect enforcement of zoning 
ordinances454 and to prevent the enforcement of zoning ordi-
nances which are invalidly enacted.455 
d. Injunction to prevent a nuisance. An injunction 
may be used to prevent a nuisance even though the use is oth-
erwise generally permitted by the zoning ordinance.456 
K. Declaratory Judgment 
In three reported cases, a private party has pleaded the 
Utah declaratory judgment statute. In all three of these cases 
the plaintiff was unsuccessful on the merits. In Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity v. Salt Lake City,457 a declaratory judgment action 
unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a zoning regulation 
which restricted fraternity and sorority houses to an area near 
the University of Utah; in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp.,458 a 
declaratory judgment action unsuccessfully challenged a rezon-
ing on the grounds that it was capricious and arbitrary; and, in 
Buhler v. Stone,459 a declaratory judgment action unsuccess-
451. For a discussion of standing, see infra text accompanying note 460. 
452. Harris, 712 P.2d at 191. 
453. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 1964). 
454. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Padjen v. Shipley, 
553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976). 
455. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986); Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968). 
456. Benjamin v. Lietz, 211 P.2d 449 (Utah 1949). 
457. 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). 
458. 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966). 
459. 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975). 
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fully challenged, on grounds of vagueness, a regulation requir-
ing that property be kept in a clean and sightly condition. 
L. Standing 
By statute, a municipality, county, county attorney, or "any 
owner of real estate"460 may bring an action to enforce the 
acts or ordinances enacted pursuant to those acts. If the action 
is for injunctive relief, the acts provide that a municipality or a 
county "need only establish the violation to obtain the injunc-
tion."461 However, in Harris v. Springville City,462 Utah's 
high court held that, for a private party to obtain relief by en-
forcing the terms of a zoning ordinance, there must be a dem-
onstration of standing, and standing is jurisdictional.463 
Standing requires that the plaintiffs demonstrate an adverse 
interest, and, in the words of the Harris court, "that they 
[have] suffered some injury peculiar to their own property or at 
least more substantial than that suffered by the community at 
large. "464 
M. Vested Rights 
At what point can government no longer "change its mind" 
in relation to uses which may be allowed? The phrase "vested 
right" focuses on the moment when government can no longer 
change its mind and the landowner concurrently has a fixed or 
vested right to government approval for his or her project. 
In 1974, the Utah Supreme Court decided Contracts Fund-
ing & Mortgage Exchange v. Maynes,465 in which a property 
owner applied to Salt Lake County for a building permit to 
construct a mobile home park on what was then unzoned prop-
erty. The county delayed the application until it could zone the 
property and then denied the application.466 The court held 
that the landowner's rights were determined at the time he 
made his application, and because a mobile home park was 
permitted (or at least not prohibited) at the time of application, 
460. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-1002(1)(a) (1991). 
461. !d. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(b), 17-27-1002(1)(b). 
462. 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984). 
463. !d. at 190. 
464. !d. at 191; see also Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 93R, 939 (Utah 1976). 
465. 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974). 
466. !d. at 1073-74. 
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a permit should be issued if there were no defects in the appli-
cation.467 
The inflexibility of the Contracts Funding decision was 
softened in 1980 when the Utah Supreme Court decided West-
ern Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan.468 In Western Land 
Equities, the court held that the claim of a landowner to a 
permit or approval based upon current zoning should be bal-
anced against: ( 1) "compelling, countervailing public inter-
est[s]"469; and, (2) the existence, if any, of pending proceed-
ings to change zoning requirements.470 The court held: 
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision 
approval if his proposed development meets the zoning require-
ments in existence at the time of his application and if he 
proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, coun-
tervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has 
initiated proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a land-
owner who subsequently makes application for a permit is not 
entitled to rely on the original zoning classification. 471 
The Western Land Equities decision was reaffirmed in 1994 
in Stucker v. Summit County.472 In Stucker, the plaintiff pur-
chased a lot in a subdivision which was originally platted in 
1964. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the uses to which 
the lot could be applied were those in effect when the appli-
cation was made for a building permit in 1990, not those in 
effect when the subdivision plat was approved in 1964.473 The 
court stated: 
467. !d. at 1074 (where the holding was clear but the basis for it was not 
clearly articulated. However, the court did state: "The presumption in this case is 
in favor of the applicant's right, with incidental, but serious constitutional and oth-
er problems posed by the facts here as to due process, impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts, scope of sover<~ign authority, etc."). 
468. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 
469. !d. at 896. 
470. !d. 
471. !d. (emphasis added); see also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 
897, 900-01 (Utah 1988) (holding that because plaintiff's application was defective 
and because a zone change was pending at the time of the plaintiff's application, 
the plaintiff failed both of the Western Land Equities tests and was not entitled to 
a building permit). 
472. 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
47:3. The Stucker decision bears a superficial resemblance to Wood v. North 
Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964), but in Wood, the city was indirectly attempt-
ing to amend subdivision plat boundaries by a zoning ordinance text amendment, 
whereas in Stucker, only the uses within the subdivision plat were affected. 
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Accordingly, pursuant to the Western Land decision, the 
Stuckers' application for a building permit in 1990 fixed the 
1985 Code as the governing ordinance, not the 1977 Code. 
Thus, the Stuckers have no claim of a vested right under the 
1977 Code because they did not apply for a building permit 
during the period when the 1977 Code applied.474 
N. Other Remedies 
65 
As discussed above, remedies available in a zoning enforce-
ment action include injunctions, mandamus, or abatement for 
the purpose of preventing or removing the unlawful building or 
use.475 Concerning these remedies, "[ w]hen a municipal corpo-
ration seeks vindication of public rights by injunction, in a 
court of equity, it is on the same footing as any private person 
or corporation."476 In addition, a structure in violation of a 
zoning ordinance may be ordered removed,477 and a munici-
pality may enforce its zoning ordinance by withholding building 
permits.478 Moreover, the legislative body may choose to en-
force its zoning ordinance by the use of civil penalties.479 
Criminal violations of the zoning ordinance are punishable as 
class C misdemeanors.480 
VI. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
[A board of adjustment's] functions are limited to making 
adjustments under the ordinances in order that they will not 
be as the law of the Medes and the Persians. 481 
A. Creation 
In cities and counties, a board of adjustment is required as 
a condition to the exercise of zoning powers.482 A city board 
474. Stucker, 870 P.2d at 286. 
475. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-1002(1)(a) (1991). 
476. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138-39 (Utah 1976). 
477. Hargraves v. Young, 280 P.2d 974, 975 (Utah 1955) (ordering carport con-
structed in violation of sideyard requirements to be removed). 
478. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1002(2) (1992). 
4 79. ld. § 10-9-1003(1), (2)(b). 
480. ld. § 10-9-1003(2)(a). 
481. Provo City v. Claudin, 63 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 1936). 
482. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-701(1) (1992), 17-27-701(1) (Supp. 1994). 
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consists of five members,483 whereas a county board has ei-
ther three or five. 484 The literal statutory language for county 
boards is "three to five members,"485 but voting requirements 
are given only for three- and five-member boards,486 implying 
that an odd number of members is intended. 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason for 
a county board of adjustment to have "three to five" members 
while a city board of adjustment has five members. The acts 
should be made uniform by amending the county act to pro-
vide that a county board of adjustment shall have five mem-
bers.487 
Members of city boards serve staggered488 terms of five 
years,489 whereas members of county boards serve whatever 
term length is prescribed in the county zoning ordinance.490 
Earlier statutory provisions that required or limited service on 
city and county boards of adjustment by a member of the plan-
ning commission have been repealed.491 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason to 
require members of a city board of adjustment to serve a term 
of five years while members of a county board of adjustment 
serve the term length prescribed in the county zoning ordi-
nance. The acts should be made uniform by amending the city 
act to provide that members of a city board of adjustment 
483. ld. § 10-9-701(2)(a). 
484. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
485. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
486. ld. § 17-27-702(5). 
487. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-701(2)(a) should be amended as fol-
lows: 
(2)(b) The board of adjustment shall consist of [thFee to] five members 
and whatever alternate members that the chief executive officer considers 
appropriate. 
488. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-701(2)(c) (1992). 
489. ld. § 10-9-701(2)(b). 
490. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
491. Compare Planning, ch. 15, sec. 1, § 15-8-96, 1949 Utah Laws 20, 21-22 
(repealed 1991) and Board of Adjustment Amendments, ch. 124, sec. 2, § 10-9-7, 
1987 Utah Laws 684, 685 (repealed 1991) (outlining city requirements relating to 
planning commission members serving on a board of adjustment) and Zoning and 
Planning Commission, ch. 23, § 15, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 33 (repealed 1991) (out-
lining county requirements relating to planning commission members serving on a 
board of adjustment) with Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, sees. 33, 86, 
§§ 10-9-701, 17-27-701, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 883, 896 (outlining city and county 
requirements relating to members of a board of adjustment). 
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shall serve the term length prescribed in the city zoning ordi-
nance.492 
67 
Alternate members may be appointed in cities and counties 
in whatever number "the chief executive officer considers ap-
propriate."493 In both cities and counties, the legislative body 
is required to adopt rules regulating the service of alternate 
members,494 with the limitation that "[n]o more than two al-
ternate members may sit at any meeting of the board of adjust-
ment at one time."495 If this limitation (no more than two al-
ternate members may sit at one time) is intended to ensure a 
majority of regular board members at any meeting, it will suc-
ceed in cities but may not in counties, because counties may 
elect to use a three-member board instead of the five-member 
board that cities must use. 
In cities and counties, appointment of board members, 
including alternates, is made by the chief executive officer, 
with the advice and consent of the legislative body. 496 The 
chief executive officer may remove any member for cause, 
based on written charges,497 with a public hearing at the 
member's demand.498 If an appointment is made to fill a va-
cancy, the appointee serves for the balance of the unfinished 
term.499 In addition, an administrative officer may be ap-
pointed to "decide routine and uncontested matters before the 
board of adjustment."500 
In cities, the chief executive officer is the mayor, unless 
there is a city manager,501 in which event the city manager 
appoints board members. In counties, the chief executive officer 
is the county commissioner, unless the county has adopted an 
492. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-701(2)(b) should be amended as fol-
lows: 
(b) The chief executive officer shall appoint the members and alternate 
members with the advice and consent of the legislative body for a term 
[af five years] established by ordinance. 
493. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-701(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
494. ld. §§ 10-9-701(3)(b), 17-27-701(3)(b). 
495. ld. §§ 10-9-701(3)(a), 17-27-701(:-l)(a). 
496. ld. §§ 10-9-701(2)(b), 17-27-701(2)(c). 
497. ld. §§ 10-9-701(4)(a), 17-27-701(4)(a). 
498. I d. §§ 10-9-701(4)(b), 17-27 -701(4){b). 
499. ld. §§ 10-9-701(5)(b), 17-27-701(5){b). 
500. ld. §§ 10-9-705, 17-27-705. 
501. ld. § 10-9-103(1)(b). 
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alternative form of government, in which event appointments 
are made by the official who exercises executive powers.502 
B. Meetings and Records 
In cities and counties, board members are empowered to 
organize and elect a chair.503 In addition, they may adopt 
rules which are not inconsistent with their zoning ordi-
nance.504 The board meets at the call of the chair or as the 
board otherwise determines.505 The chair, or acting chair, 
may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witness-
es.506 Board members may be compensated on a per diem ba-
sis for their service. 507 
1. Open meetings 
In cities and counties, "[a}ll meetings" of a board of adjust-
ment must comply with the requirements of the Open and 
Public Meetings law.508 That law prohibits closed meetings by 
a public body,509 with statutory exceptions not generally ap-
plicable to the business of a board of adjustment.510 As a mat-
ter of practice, it is not uncommon for the business of a board 
to be subdivided into three different parts: (1) a private "pre-
meeting" in which staff review the public meeting agenda with 
board members and educate them with respect to issues on 
which they may be required to make a decision; (2) a general 
public meeting in which evidence and public comment are re-
ceived in relation to issues before the board; and, (3) a private 
meeting of the board in which evidence and law are discussed 
and decisions made.5n Contrary to some of this practice, 
Utah Supreme Court decisions require all but the last of these 
meetings to be open to the public. 
502. Id. § 17-27-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
503. Id. §§ 10-9-702(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-702(1)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
504. Id. §§ 10-9-702(1)(b), 17-27-702(1)(b). 
505. Id. §§ 10-9-702(2), 17-27-702(2). 
506. I d. §§ 10-9-702(3), 17-27 -702(3). 
507. !d. §§ 10-9-702(7), 17-27 -702(7). 
508. Id. §§ 10-9-702(4)(a), 17-27-702(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
509. Id. § fi2-4-3 (1989). 
510. Id. § 52-4-5(1). 
511. See, e.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
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In Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service Commis-
sion,512 the Utah Supreme Court applied the open meeting 
requirement to the Utah Public Service Commission and noted 
that some of the business of the commission is judicial in na-
ture. In some things, "the Commission hears and determines 
issues which are disputed between competing and protesting 
[parties]," and, in resolving those issues, "the Commission is 
required by law to operate very much in the same manner as 
courts."513 Specifically, in such ')udicial" matters the commis-
sion "is empowered to conduct hearings, administer oaths, 
compel attendance of witnesses, obtain depositions and the 
production of documents. Its decisions are required to be sup-
ported by written findings."514 Those matters which are thus 
judicial in nature, the court said, have an "information obtain-
ing'' phase and a "decision making'' phase.515 As to the "deci-
sion making'' phase, the court recognized an implied exemption 
from the open meetings requirements. 516 
In Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons,517 when confront-
ed with a claim that a meeting of the Utah Board of Pardons 
should have been open to the public, the court applied its hold-
ing in Common Cause in a straightforward manner: 
[T]he Board proceedings to date consisted not of information 
gathering, but of deliberations over the petition for a new 
commutation hearing, deliberations that included a review of 
the full public commutation hearing held in 1989. If this is 
the case, these proceedings would be of a judicial nature and 
exempt from the provisions of the [Open and Public Meetings] 
statute.518 
The statutory exceptions in the Open and Public Meetings 
law do not authorize holding a private "pre-meeting" before a 
public board meeting. 519 By their nature such meetings are 
informational and not judicial, and, thus, there is no exemption 
in the Common Cause holding. To the contrary, in Davis Coun-
512. 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). 
513. ld. at 1314. 
li14. ld. 
515. ld. at 1315. 
516. ld. 
517. 836 P.2d 790 (Utah 1992). 
518. ld. at 792-93 (emphasis added). 
519. UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-5(1) (1989). 
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ty v. Clearfield City,520 the Utah Court of Appeals condemned 
"the secretive nature and lack of any record or minutes" of pre-
meetings. 521 
Meetings of a board of adjustment for the purpose of re-
ceiving evidence and public comment must obviously be open to 
the public; nonetheless, the board may thereafter retire to 
deliberate privately. As to private deliberations, a board of 
adjustment, like the Public Service Commission in Common 
Cause, must in judicial fashion decide issues between compet-
ing parties.522 It follows that a board of adjustment is exempt 
from the open meeting requirement when deliberating. 
2. Records 
The records of a board of adjustment must be kept in the 
office of the board. 523 In addition, "[ a]ll records in the office of 
the board of adjustment are public records"524 ; under the pro-
visions of the Government Records Access and Management 
Act, any person may examine and copy public records. 525 
C. General Function 
In Provo City v. Claudin,526 the Utah Supreme Court de-
clared that the purpose of a board of adjustment is to make 
adjustments under a zoning ordinance, with the objective "to 
make the [zoning] ordinance pliable enough so as not to mili-
tate against the public welfare."527 However, in Claudin, and 
later in Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co.,528 the court cau-
tioned that a board of adjustment is an administrative body 
and its actions are limited by the terms of the zoning ordinance 
enacted by the legislative body.529 Since Walton, the Utah 
fi20. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (decided on other grounds). 
521. ld. at 709. 
fi22. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703 (1992), 17-27-703 (Supp. 1994). 
fi23. ld. §§ 10-9-702(4)(d), 17-27-702(4)(d). 
524. ld. §§ 10-9-702(4)(e), 17-27-702(4)(e) (emphasis added). 
525. ld. § 6:3-2-201(1) (1993) ("Every person has the right to inspect a public 
record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public record during nor-
mal working hours .... "). 
526. 63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936). 
527. ld. at 574. 
528. 92 P.2d 724 (Utah 1939). 
529. ld. at 728 ("The board of zoning appeals (board of adjustment) is en-
trusted with the duty of enforcing the provisions of the ordinance; it is an admin-
istrative body, without a vestige of legislative power."); see also Claudin, 63 P.2d 
at 574. 
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courts have been consistent in holding that the work of a board 
of adjustment is administrative in nature and not legislative. 
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp.,530 the Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated this point when it stated, "we hold that the 
authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly an executive 
function rather than a legislative one."531 Similarly, the court 
of appeals in Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. 
Sandy City held: "we conclude that the hearing of conditional 
use permit appeals is an executive function and not a legisla-
tive function."532 
D. Legislative Body Versus Board of Adjustment 
The statutory proposition that a board of adjustment may 
make final decisions in matters of zoning administration has 
been contested by local legislative bodies wishing to reserve 
that power to themselves. Thus, there is a tendency for a local 
legislative body to enact a zoning ordinance which purports to 
grant powers of zoning administration to the legislative body 
which, by statute, are the business of the board of adjustment. 
Chronologically, the seminal decision was a county case, 
Thurston v. Cache County,533 in which the Utah Supreme 
Court approved a zoning ordinance procedure wherein condi-
tional use permit appeals went from the planning commission 
to the county commission, and not to the board of adjust-
ment.534 The county enabling act then in force provided that 
the county commission "may provide that the board of adjust-
ment may ... make special exceptions."535 The court held the 
discretionary form of this language gave the county a choice 
whether to vest special exception (conditional use536) appeals 
in the board of adjustment or elsewhere.537 However, in all of 
the city cases which followed, the result differed for a variety of 
reasons. 
530. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). 
531. Id. at 899 (emphasis added). 
532. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
533. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981). 
534. Id. at 444-47. 
535. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-15 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). 
536. For a discussion of special exceptions and conditional uses, see supra 
parts III.G-H. 
537. Thurston., 626 P.2d at 446. 
72 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 9 
The first city case on this issue was Chambers v. 
Smithfield City,538 in which the zoning ordinance gave the 
city council final authority to grant variances, like the county 
commission did with special exceptions (conditional uses) in 
Thurston. But the city enabling act then in force provided that 
the board of adjustment shall have the power to authorize vari-
ances.539 The Utah Supreme Court held that the mandatory 
form of this language required that only the board of adjust-
ment, and not the city council, had authority to grant 
variances. 540 
The next city case was Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 541 
Factually, Scherbel was like Thurston (a county decision) to the 
extent that, in both cases, the local zoning ordinance purported 
to give jurisdiction over special exceptions (conditional use 
permits) to the legislative body and not to the board of adjust-
ment. But the two cases were different for two reasons: first, 
Salt Lake City operated under an optional council-mayor form 
of government, and, second, the county enabling act then in 
force allowed discretion with respect to special exception ( condi-
tional use permit) jurisdiction, 542 but the city enabling act 
then in force did not. 543 The Scherbel court focused on both 
differences and invalidated the procedure which allowed the 
Salt Lake City municipal council to hear and decide special 
exceptions. 
Specifically, the Scherbel court noted its holding in 
Martindale v. Anderson, that resolving zoning disputes is an 
executive function, 544 and ruled that a municipal council han-
dling such matters violated the concept of a separation of pow-
ers.545 In addition, the Court held that its reasoning in 
Chambers applied to special exceptions as well as to variances. 
That is, the city enabling act provided that "[t]he board of ad-
justment shall have [the power to hear and decide special ex-
ceptions]," and the mandatory form of this language vested 
538. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). 
539. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-12 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
540. Chambers, 714 P.2d at 1137. 
541. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). 
542. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-16(2) (1953) (repealed 1991). 
543. !d. § 10-9-12(2) (1953) (repealed 1991). 
544. Scherbel, 758 P.2d at 899 (noting Martindale v. Anderson, 5R1 P.2d 1022, 
1027 (Utah 1978)). 
545. !d. "As in Martindale, we hold that the authority to resolve zoning dis-
putes is properly an executive function rather than a legislative one." !d. 
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only the board of adjustment, and not the municipal council, 
with authority to hear and decide special exceptions.546 
The result was the same in Davis County v. Clearfield 
City,547 an opinion by the court of appeals which was handed 
down only ten days after the opinion of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Scherbel. The Clearfield City zoning ordinance re-
quired that conditional use decisions by the planning commis-
sion be appealed to the city council and not to the board of 
adjustment. Although Clearfield City was not operating under 
the Optional Forms of Government Act, the court disapproved 
the procedure, applying the Chambers and Scherbel reasoning, 
which stated that the mandatory language of the city enabling 
act permitted only a board of adjustment to hear and decide 
zoning appeals related to conditional uses. 548 
The most recent of these cases, Salt Lake County Cotton-
wood Sanitary District v. Sandy City,549 focuses on statutory 
language that originated as a 1989 amendment to the Utah 
Municipal Code. The Utah Municipal Code provided that 
"[a]ppeals from decisions of the planning and zoning commis-
sion regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the 
board of adjustment unless the legislative body of the munici-
pality by ordinance has designated another body as the appel-
late body for those matters."550 Drawing on this language 
(that the legislative body may designate a body other than the 
board of adjustment to hear conditional use permit appeals), 
the Sandy City zoning ordinance vested in the municipal coun-
cil (operating in a council-mayor form of government) the power 
to hear appeals from conditional use permit decisions. But 
again, the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, focusing on the 
holding established in Martindale that a legislative body oper-
ating under The Optional Forms of Government Act cannot 
perform executive functions of zoning administration. That 
principle, declared the court, requires an interpretation of sec-
546. !d. "However, in Chambers, we explained that 'the statutory provisions 
regarding county boards of adjustment are entirely different from those concerning 
city boards of adjustment.'" !d. n.4; see Chambers, 714 P.2d at 1137. 
fi47. 7fi6 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
548. Scherbel, 758 P.2d at 899. 
549. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
550. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8(3) (1989) (emphasis added). This provision was 
recodified in substantially the same form in the Municipal Land Use Development 
and Management Act as UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-704(2). See infra 
part VI.H.1 for further discussion of these provisions. 
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tion 10-9-8(3) that the chosen appellate body be one outside the 
legislative branch of government.551 
E. Board of Adjustment Jurisdiction 
Against a backdrop of the jurisdictional struggle between 
boards of adjustment and legislative bodies, the new enabling 
acts provide that a legislative body may choose in several mat-
ters whether decisions will be made by a board of adjustment 
or by another body, which is usually the legislative body itself. 
The matters of zoning administration over which a board of 
adjustment must have, or may be given, jurisdiction in a zon-
ing ordinance include: (a) appeals from zoning decisions; (b) 
special exceptions; (c) conditional use permits; (d) variances; 
and, (e) nonconforming uses. 
F. Zoning Appeals 
The first class of issues over which city and county boards 
of adjustment have jurisdiction may be referred to as zoning 
appeals. A board of adjustment in cities and counties has exclu-
sive jurisdiction in these matters because the enabling acts 
provide that a board of adjustment "shall hear and decide" 
controversies which are "appeals from zoning decisions apply-
ing the zoning ordinance."552 Zoning decisions which may be 
appealed include orders, requirements, decisions, or determina-
tions made by zoning officials in administering or interpreting 
the zoning ordinance. 553 
Curiously, however, a county board of adjustment may not 
"interpret the zoning maps and pass upon disputed questions of 
lot lines, district boundary lines, or similar questions" (not to 
be confused with the power to interpret the text of a zoning 
ordinance), unless so authorized by the legislative body.554 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason 
why a county board of adjustment should require special 
authorization to "interpret the zoning maps and pass upon 
disputed questions of lot lines, district boundary lines, or 
similar questions,"555 while city boards of adjustment have 
551. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist., 879 P.2d at 13R3 n.5. 
552. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(1) (1992), 17-27-703(1) (Supp. 1994) (empha-
sis added). 
553. Id. §§ 10-9-704ClXaXi), 17-27-704(1Xa)(i). 
554. ld. § 17-27-703(3) (emphasis added). 
55fi. ld. § 17-27-703(3). 
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no such limitation. The county act should be amended to 
repeal this limitation.556 
75 
Zoning decisions may be appealed by persons affected 
thereby557 and by officers and subdivisions of the city or coun-
ty.558 The time within which to appeal a zoning decision to a 
board of adjustment is "a reasonable time," which is fixed in 
the zoning ordinance. 559 
Proposed Legislative Change. The zoning ordinance establish-
es the time within which to appeal to a board of adjustment; 
but some zoning ordinances are in disrepair and may fail to 
so provide. To avoid jurisdictional problems, the enabling acts 
should provide a time period for appeal to be used if the zon-
ing ordinance does not provide such a time period.560 
The former city enabling act specified in detail: with whom 
a notice of appeal should be filed and the content of that 
notice;561 the staying of a zoning decision by a board of ad-
justment pending a decision on the merits;562 the transmittal 
of records;563 notice to parties in interest and the general 
556. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-703(3) should be repealed. 
557. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(i) (1992), 17-27-704(l)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1994). 
558. ld. §§ 10-9-704(1)(b), 17-27-704(1)(b). 
559. ld. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(ii), 17-27-704(1)(a)(ii). 
560. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(ii) and 17-27-704(1)(a)(ii) 
should both be amended as follows: 
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a reason-
able time for appeal to the board of decisions administering or interpret-
ing a zoning ordinance. If the legislative body does not so provide, the 
time for appeal shall be ten (10) days from the date the decision is ren-
dered. 
561. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-9 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
562. ld. § 10-9-10 (1953) (repealed 1991). In the original city enabling act, an 
administrative appeal automatically stayed all proceedings unless the administra-
tive officer (because of "imminent peril to life or property") requested otherwise, in 
which event the appellant could request a restraining order from the board or a 
district court. This procedure was not changed until 1991. Compare Cities to Regu-
late Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, § 7, 1925 Utah Laws 240, 242-
44 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, sec. 36, § 10-9-
704, 1991 Utah Laws R73, 884. The county enabling acts contained no provisions 
related to a stay of proceedings, but, in general, permitted a county commission to 
establish procedures related to appeals. Compare Zoning and Planning Commission, 
ch. 23, § 16, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 33-34 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning 
Revisions, ch. 235, sec. 89, § 17-27-704, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 897. 
563. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-9 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
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public;564 the obligation of the board to make a timely deci-
sion;565 and, appearances by agents or attorneys.566 In con-
trast, the former county enabling act gave no guidance with 
respect to these details and provided instead that they would 
be resolved in "general rules" provided by the county commis-
sion or in "supplemental rules of procedure" adopted by the 
board of adjustment itself. 567 
The present enabling acts adopt the county approach re-
garding these issues, and in cities and counties such are now 
left to local discretion in the zoning ordinance or the rules of 
the board.568 On the other hand, new mandatory procedural 
provisions have been adopted in both enabling acts which: pro-
vide that the appellant has the burden of proving the existence 
of error569 ; limit subject matter jurisdiction to decisions apply-
ing a zoning ordinance570; prohibit consideration by a board of 
adjustment of zoning ordinance amendments57 \ and, prohibit 
a board of adjustment from waiving or modifying zoning ordi-
nance requirements.572 
For a city board, the concurring vote of three out of five 
members is required to reverse an administrative decision. 57:3 
For a county board, however, a vote of four out of five members 
for a five-member board, and a unanimous vote of three mem-
bers for a three-member board, is required to reverse an ad-
ministrative decision.574 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason 
why the voting requirements should differ between cities 
(three out of five votes to reverse) and counties (four out of 
five votes to reverse). Majority-rule (three out of five votes) is 
traditional, and the county act should be so amended to pro-
564. ld. § 10-9-11 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
565. ld. 
566. ld. 
567. ld. § 17-27-16 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
568. ld. §§ 10-9-702(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-702(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
569. I d. §§ 10-9-704(3), 17-27 -704(2) (1992). 
570. ld. §§ 10-9-704(4)(a), 17-27-704(3)(a). 
571. ld. §§ 10-9-704(4)(b), 17-27-704(3)(b). 
572. ld. §§ 10-9-704(5), 17-27-704(4). 
573. ld. § 10-9-702(5). 
574. ld. § 17-27-702(5) (Supp. 1994). 
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vide. 575 (It is recommended elsewhere that counties should 
have only five-member boards of adjustment.576) 
G. Special Exceptions 
77 
In both cities and counties, the jurisdiction of a board of 
adjustment over "special exceptions"577 is described in the fol-
lowing language: {1) Sections 10-9-703(1)(b) and 17-27-
703(1)(b): "[t]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide ... 
special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance"578 ; (2) 
Sections 1 0-9-706(1)(b) and 17-27-706(1)(b): "[i]n enacting the 
zoning ordinance, the legislative body may ... grant jurisdic-
tion to the board of adjustment to hear and decide some or all 
special exceptions"579 ; and, (3) Sections 10-9-706(2) and 17-27-
706(2): "[t]he board of adjustment may hear and decide special 
exceptions only if authorized to do so by the zoning ordi-
nance ... .''
580 
On their face, these three provisions are inconsistent.581 
575. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-702(5) should be amended as fol-
lows: 
( t&l-ln onler to re•<erse any oraer, requirement, aeeisien, Of aetenmna 
tHm of any administrative offieial er ageney er te aeeiae in favor of the 
appellant, there mast be a eonearring 'iote ef: 
(a) fear members for a five member boara of aajastment; er 
· (b) three members for a three member boara ef adjustment.] 
(5) The concurring vote of three members of the board of adjustment is 
necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of 
any administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the appel-
lant. 
The proposed language is taken from UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-702(5) (1992). 
576. See discussion supra part VI.A. 
577. See supra text accompanying note 225 for a discussion on the meaning of 
the term "special exception." 
fi78. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ l0-9-708(1)(h) (1992), 17-27-708(1)(b) (Supp. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
579. !d. §§ 10-9-706(l)(b), 17-27-706(1)(1) (emphasis added). 
580. !d. §§ 10-9-706(2), 17-27-706(2) (emphasis added). 
581. It may be possible to reconcile these provisions by reference to the city 
enabling provisions which preceded them. From 1925 to 1991, the city enabling act 
provided that a "board of adjustment shall have the following power: ... (2) To 
hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which such 
board is required to pass under such ordinance." !d. § 10-9-12(2) (1958) (repealed 
1991) (emphasis added). In short, a board of adjustment shall have jurisdiction to 
hear and decide special exceptions to the extent that such is permitted by the 
terms of the zoning ordinance. By straining, it is possible to find the same mean-
ing in the present sections. Thus, § 708(1)(b) may be read to provide that a board 
of adjustment shall hear and decide special exceptions as the legislative body may 
permit, as provided in §§ 706(1)(b) and 706(2). But this interpretation stretches the 
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Section 703(1) provides that a board of adjustment shall have 
jurisdiction over special exceptions, but sections 706(1) and 
706(2) provide that a board of adjustment may have that juris-
diction if the legislative body so provides. 
Proposed Legislative Change. There is a conflict in the statu-
tory provisions conferring board of adjustment jurisdiction 
over "special exceptions." Both acts should be amended to give 
the legislative body discretion to determine the extent of the 
board of adjustment's jurisdiction over "special excep-
tions."582 
H. Conditional Use Permits 
1. Conditional use permits in cities 
The city enabling act handles board of adjustment jurisdic-
tion over conditional use permits differently than does the 
county enabling act. The jurisdiction of a city board of adjust-
ment in relation to conditional use permits is stated in three 
different sections: (1) Section 10-9-407(2): "[t]he board of adjust-
ments has jurisdiction to decide appeals of the approval or 
denial of conditional use permits unless the legislative body 
has enacted an ordinance designating another body as the 
appellate body for those appeals."583; (2) Section 10-9-704(2): 
"[t]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals from 
planning commission decisions regarding conditional use per-
mits unless the zoning ordinance designates another body to 
hear conditional use permit appeals."584 ; and, (3) Section 10-
9-706(3): "[t]he legislative body may provide that conditional 
use permits be treated as special exceptions in the zoning ordi-
nance."585 
2. The planning commission assumption 
With the enactment of the sections quoted above, the state 
legislature obviously assumed that in all cities a conditional 
use permit will initially be approved or denied by the planning 
plain meaning of § 703(1)(b) almost beyond the breaking point. 
582. For a specific proposal to revise the enabling acts in relation to board of 
adjustment jurisdiction over "special exceptions," see discussion infra note 598 and 
accompanying text. 
583. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-407(2) (1992) (emphasis added). 
584. ld. § 10-9-704(2) (emphasis added). 
585. ld. § 10-9-706(3) (emphasis added). 
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commission. Examples of this procedure (conditional use per-
mits being first approved or denied by the planning commis-
sion) are described in Davis County v. Clearfield Citl86 and 
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 587 Assuming original action 
by the planning commission, the real question addressed by the 
quoted sections is what body will thereafter hear conditional 
use permit appeals from the planning commission. The clear 
answer of the quoted sections is that the local legislative body 
can choose the body it wants; although, in practical terms, the 
two obvious choices are the board of adjustment or the legisla-
tive body itself. 
3. The Orem City example 
But the assumption that conditional use permits will al-
ways be issued first by the planning commission is incorrect. 
Consider, for example, a city such as Orem, Utah: the terms of 
the zoning ordinance allow the planning commission only to 
recommend the approval or denial of a conditional use permit, 
after which the official decision to approve or deny is made by 
the city council. 588 In relation to Orem's conditional use struc-
ture, the three sections quoted above wreak procedural havoc. 
When section 407(2) is applied to an administrative struc-
ture such as that in Orem, the result is that section 407(2) 
requires that the board of adjustment (or some other body 
designated by the city council) review the decisions of the city 
council. This is objectionable because it places the legislative 
body (the author of the zoning ordinance and the creator of the 
board of adjustment) in a subordinate position in relation to 
the administration of conditional use permits. Indeed, in 
Thurston v. Cache County,589 when the Utah Supreme Court 
heard the argument that a board of adjustment must review 
permits issued by the county commission, the court mildly 
ridiculed the argument by saying that "[p]laintiffs' interpreta-
tion ... imposes a curious administrative paradox."590 
Neither the language of section 704(2) nor the language of 
section 706(3) will rescue a city like Orem from the "curious 
administrative paradox" created by the convergence of the city 
586. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
587. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988). 
588. 0REM, UTAH, 0REM CITY CODE § 22-4-3 (1990). 
589. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981). 
590. !d. at 446. 
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council's desire to originally issue conditional use permits and 
the requirements of section 407(2). Section 704(2) offers no help 
because by its terms it applies to "appeals from planning com-
mission decisions,"591 not city council decisions. Moreover, 
section 706(3) offers no help because it simply allows condition-
al use permits to be treated as special exceptions, in which 
event the permit could be issued by the board of adjustment, 
without city council involvement. 
4. Conditional use permits in counties 
With respect to the administrative process for conditional 
use permits in counties, there is no counterpart to either the 
troublesome section 10-9-407(2) or to section 10-9-704(2).592 
The lack of statutory guidance for counties in relation to grant-
ing or denying conditional use permits means that a county 
legislative body is constrained only by the normal bounds of 
legislative discretion in the structure of its conditional use 
permit process.593 Counties do, however, have a counterpart 
to section 10-9-706(3),594 which provides that conditional use 
permits may be treated as special exceptions in the zoning ordi-
nance; in other words, they may be directly issued by the board 
of adjustment. 
Proposed Legislative Change. There are three statutory prob-
lems which come together at this point: (1) in cities, the statu-
tory conflict concerning board of adjustment jurisdiction over 
"special exceptions"595 ; (2) in cities, the statutory assump-
tion that all conditional use permits will first be granted by a 
planning commission596; and, (3) in counties, the lack of 
statutory guidance with respect to conditional use permit ap-
peals.597 These three problems should be resolved: (1) in cit-
ies and counties, by giving the legislative body discretion to 
decide whether special exception (conditional use permit) ap-
peals will be handled by the board of adjustment or another 
591. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) (1992) (emphasis added). 
592. Compare id. §§ 10-9-407(2), -704(2) (1992) with id. §§ 17-27-406 (1991), -
704 (Supp. 1994). 
593. See generally State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) 
(Counties have "independent authority" to pass ordinances providing for public 
safety, health, morals, and welfare.). 
594. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-706(;{) (Supp. 1994). 
595. See discussion supra part VLG. 
596. See discussion supra part VLH.2. 
597. See supra the discussion in this immediate section. 
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body; and, (2) in cities and counties, by allowing the legisla-
tive body the discretion to create alternative special exception 
(conditional use permit) approval procedures.598 
I. Variances 
81 
The enabling acts provide that a "board of adjustment shall 
hear and decide . . . variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance."599 The acts also provide that a person desiring a 
variance "may apply to the board of adjustment."600 There are 
no provisions to the contrary, with the result that a board of 
adjustment has exclusive jurisdiction to grant variances. This 
is consistent with the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Chambers v. Smithfield City,601 holding that under the former 
city enabling statute, a city board of adjustment has exclusive 
jurisdiction to grant variances, which power cannot be vested 
in a city council.602 
There are specific conditions prerequisite to granting a 
variance. In summary form, those conditions include the follow-
ing, all of which must be met: 
598. Specifically, the following legislative changes should be made: 
1. For a proposed legislative change providing that "a conditional use 
is a type of special exception," see supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-407(2) should be repealed. 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703 and 17-27-703 should be amended as 
follows: 
(1) Unless the legislative body (in any form of local government*) other-
wise provides, t[~]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordin1nce; and 
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance (including 
conditional use permits).[~ 
(e) variaHees frsm the terms ef the ~sHiHg srdiHaHee.] 
(2) Unless the legislative body (in any form of local government*) other-
wise provides, t[~]he board of adjustment may make determinations re-
garding the existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses [if 
that llUthsrity is delegated ts them hy the legislati'le belly]. 
(3) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide variances from the 
terms of the zoning ordinance. 
(* The phrase "in any form of local government" should be deleted if it is 
determined that legislative bodies in optional forms of government should 
not participate in zoning administration.) 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) should be repealed. 
5. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-706 and 17-27-706 should be repealed. 
599. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(1)(c) (1992), 17-27-703(1)(c) (Supp. 1994). 
600. !d. §§ 10-9-707(1), 17-27-707(1). 
601. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). 
602. !d. at 1136. 
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1. Unreasonable hardship 
A variance may be granted if literal enforcement of the 
zoning ordinance would cause the applicant an unreasonable 
hardship.603 The hardship must be located on or associated 
with the property,604 come from conditions peculiar to the 
property and not conditions general to the neighborhood,605 
and cannot be self-imposed or economic.606 
2. Special circumstances 
A variance may be granted if special circumstances attach 
to the property which do not apply to other properties in the 
same district. 607 The special circumstances must relate to the 
hardship complained of608 and deprive the property of privi-
leges granted to other properties in the same district. 609 
3. Property rights 
The granting of a variance must be "essential to the enjoy-
ment of a substantial property right possessed by other proper-
ty in the same district."610 
4. General plan and public interest 
Granting a variance may not substantially affect the gener-
al plan and may not be contrary to the public interest.611 
603. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(i) (1992), 17-27-707(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1994). 
604. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(i)(A), 17-27 -707(2)(b)(i)(A). 
605. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(i)(B), 17-27 -707(2)(b)(i)(B). 
606. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(ii), 17-27-707(2)(b)(ii). "Economic hardship" apparently 
refers to revenues which may be lost if a variance is not granted. See, e.g., Otto v. 
Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. 1939) (holding a variance allowing a property 
owner to locate part of a roller skating rink on property zoned residential was im-
proper because it did not meet the three elements constituting unnecessary hard-
ship). 
607. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(ii) (1992), 17-27-707(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1994). 
608. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(c)(i), 17-27 -707(2)(c)(i). 
609. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(c)(ii), 17 -27-707(2)(c)(ii). 
610. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(iii), 17-27 -707(2)(a)(iii). 
611. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(iv), 17-27-707(2)(a)(iv). 
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5. Spirit of ordinance and substantial justice 
In granting a variance, the spirit of the zoning ordinance 
must be observed and substantial justice done. 612 
6. Example of a variance 
These statutory conditions are not otherwise explained. 
Their apparent meaning may be illustrated by a simple exam-
ple in which a small stream traverses a parcel of property. The 
property owner is generally entitled to a building permit to 
construct a residence, but placement of the residence caused by 
the location of the stream causes a violation of sideyard re-
quirements. A variance from enforcement of the sideyard re-
quirements will, if granted, allow the applicant to construct a 
residence. 
The following is a discussion of the above requirements as 
they relate to the example: (1) Unreasonable hardship: literal 
enforcement of the sideyard requirements will unreasonably 
prevent issuance of a building permit because sideyard require-
ments cannot be met. The hardship is located on the property 
and comes from a problem peculiar to the property and not the 
general neighborhood. The hardship is not self-imposed, and is 
not economic; (2) Special circumstances: a stream causing a 
sideyard violation is a problem only on this parcel of property, 
and it is this circumstance which prevents issuance of a build-
ing permit. Other lots in the same district qualify for a building 
permit; (3) Property rights: if a variance is not granted, the 
applicant will not receive a building permit, which is a privi-
lege enjoyed by other property in the district; (4) General plan 
and public interest: the granting of a variance will not adverse-
ly affect the general plan or the public interest because the 
general plan and the existing zone favor the construction of 
residences in the district; and, (5) Spirit of ordinance and sub-
stantial justice: the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed 
because construction of a residence is permitted according to 
the general intent of the zoning ordinance. Substantial justice 
is accomplished because the applicant is treated consistently 
with the treatment of others in the same district. 
612. !d. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(v), 17-27 -707(2)(a)(v). 
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7. Supporting evidence and other provisions 
The acts provide that "[t]he applicant shall bear the bur-
den of proving that all of the conditions justifying a variance 
have been met."613 It has been held that a decision granting a 
variance will not be sustained on appeal if there is not substan-
tial evidence in the record to support it.614 In Chambers v. 
Smithfield City,615 the Utah Supreme Court overturned the 
grant of a variance to build a house on a .67-acre lot in a one-
acre zone. According to the court, "[t]here is simply no evidence 
in the record to support any one of the Board's findings. In fact, 
what evidence exists tends only to support a denial of the vari-
ance."616 
In Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City,617 
the Utah Supreme Court used the following language in over-
turning the grant of a variance: 
It is not enough to show that the property for which the 
variance is requested is different in some way from the prop-
erty surrounding it. Each piece of property is unique. What 
must be shown by the applicant for the variance is that the 
property itself contains some special circumstance that relates 
to the hardship complained of and that granting a variance to 
take this into account would not substantially affect the zon-
ing plan. Respondent has failed to meet this burden. 
The evidence adduced does not support respondent's 
claim of special circumstance. The property is neither unusual 
topographically or by shape, nor is there anything extraordi-
nary about the piece of property itself. Simply having an old 
building on land upon which a new building has been con-
structed does not constitute special circumstances.618 
The acts also provide that variances "run with the 
land,"619 and that conditions may be attached to the grant of 
a variance.620 Moreover, the acts provide that a "use vari-
ance" cannot be granted. 621 
613. ld. §§ 10-9-707(3), 17-27-707(3). 
614. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038 
(Utah 1984). 
615. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). 
616. ld. at 1135. 
617. 685 P.2d at 1032. 
618. ld. at 1036. 
619. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(4) (1992), 17-27-707(4) (Supp. 1994). 
620. !d. §§ 10-9-707(6), 17-27 -707(6). 
621. !d. §§ 10-9-707(5), 17-27 -707(5). 
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A 'use' variance, as the term implies, is one which per-
mits a use of land other than those prescribed by the zoning 
regulations. Thus, a variance which permits a commercial use 
in a residential district, or which permits a multiple dwelling 
in a district limited to single-family homes, is a use vari-
ance.622 
85 
The variance described in the example above--a stream 
crossing a residential building lot623-is not a "use" variance; 
the applicant was asking for a permit to build a residence in a 
district zoned residential. The variance related only to sideyard 
requirements. 
J. Nonconforming Uses 
The acts provide that "[t]he board of adjustment may make 
determinations regarding the existence, expansion, or modifica-
tion of nonconforming uses if that authority is delegated to 
them by the legislative body."624 The acts do not explicitly 
state what body will handle nonconforming use issues if a 
board of adjustment does not. But the phrase-"delegated to 
them by the legislative body"-suggests that such issues be 
resolved by the legislative body, if not by a board of adjust-
ment. However, in a city operating under the Optional Forms 
of Government Act, such an interpretation is prevented by the 
holding in Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. 
Sandy City. 625 This holding prohibits, on separation of powers 
grounds, a municipal council from performing administrative 
functions. 626 
Proposed Legislative Change. Many local zoning ordinances 
are in disrepair, and if a local zoning ordinance does not au-
thorize the board of adjustment to handle nonconforming use 
issues, a jurisdictional ambiguity results. To minimize ambi-
guity, the presumption should be changed, giving the board of 
adjustment jurisdiction over nonconforming uses, unless the 
legislative body provides otherwise.627 
622. 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 836 (1992). 
623. See discussion supra part VI.I.6. 
624. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(2) (1992), 17-27-70:-l(2) (Supp. 1994) (empha-
sis added). 
625. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
626. ld. at 1382-83. 
627. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(2) and 17-27-703(2) should be 
amended as follows: 
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Three Utah cases deal with nonconforming uses, each hold-
ing that the burden of proving the right to a nonconforming use 
is on the person claiming it.628 The first case, Morrison v. 
Horne, 629 was a demand for a building permit to construct a 
service station in a residential zone. Although the property had 
previously been used commercially when it was in a commer-
cial zone, evidence showed that the commercial use had been 
discontinued for five years. The zoning ordinance allowed a 
discontinuance for no more than one year. The court held 
against the landowner on the basis that he had failed to meet 
his burden of proof that the commercial use had been lawfully 
established and continuously maintained. 630 
The same rule was applied in State v. Holt's Estate,631 in 
which landowners claimed that their property should be valued 
as commercial for purposes of eminent domain. The property, 
however, was zoned residential. The court held that the land-
owners had the burden of proving the continuation of a non-
conforming use. Where, as here, the property had not been 
used commercially for more than twelve years, the court cited 
its holding in Morrison and held that the landowners had failed 
to meet their burden of proving a continuation of the noncon-
forming use. 632 
In Fillmore City v. Reeve,633 however, the evidence con-
firmed that the landowners had met their burden of proof by 
continuously keeping livestock (pigs, cattle, and horses) in what 
had become a residential district that did not allow that use, 
and that this activity did not constitute a nuisance. Under 
these facts, the court held against the city because the city had 
failed to meet its burden of proof. The court stated, "when the 
non-conforming use is established, the burden of proof is re-
versed. It is then on the city to prove that the defendant violat-
(2) Unless otherwise determined by the legislative body, [~]!:_he board of 
adjustment may make determinations regarding the existence, expansion, 
or modification of nonconforming uses [if that aatheFity is delegated te 
them hy the legislati•te he Ely]. 
628. A fourth case, Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 4~1 P.2d 
559, 564 (Utah 1967), discussed issues related to nonconforming uses but was ulti-
mately decided on other grounds. 
629. 868 P.2d 1.118 (Utah 1961). 
6~0. ld. at 1114. 
631. 3111 P.2d 724 (Utah 1963). 
682. ld. at 725. 
68~. 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977). 
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ed the zoning ordinance by exceeding his established non-con-
forming use."634 
VII. APPEALS TO THE COURT 
In the case at hand, the district judge undertook to 
weigh anew the underlying factual considerations. While 
there may have been some evidence in the record to support 
the trial judge's findings, it was not his prerogative to weigh 
the evidence anew. His role was limited to determining 
whether there was evidence in the record to support the 
Board of Adjustment's action.635 
A. "Any Decision" 
In cities and counties, "[a]ny person adversely affected by 
any decision made in the exercise of the provisions of this chap-
ter [the city and county enabling acts] may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days 
after the local decision is rendered."636 This language is broad 
enough to cover appeals from all decisions of a board of adjust-
ment,637 as well as appeals from decisions of other bodies 
such as a legislative body granting or denying a conditional use 
permit.638 Enabling provisions relating to subdivisions are in-
cluded in the chapters comprising the city and county enabling 
acts,639 and thus the right of appeal also applies to subdivi-
sion Issues. 
Proposed Legislative Change. In each enabling act there are 
two sections dealing with the subject matter of appeals, re-
sulting in possibilities for confusion. (For example, UTAH 
CODE ANN. section 10-9-708(3) provides for appeal within 30 
days after the "decision is final." In possible contrast is UTAH 
CODE ANN. section 10-9-1001(2) which provides for appeal 
within 30 days after the "decision is rendered.") Depending on 
634. !d. at 1318. 
635. 685 P.2d 1032, 1085 (Utah 1984). 
636. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
687. Parallel (and redundant) provisions are found in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-
9-708 (1992), 17-27-708 (1991). 
638. Decisions regarding conditional use permits are made in the exercise of 
the provisions of the Utah Code in Chapter 9, Title 10, as well as in Chapter 27, 
Title 17. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407 (1992), 17-27-406 (Supp. 1994). 
639. !d. §§ 10-9-801 (1992), 17-27-801 (1991). 
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the context, duplicative language like this can cause needless 
confusion. The duplicative sections should be combined and 
possible inconsistencies reconciled. 640 
640. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-708 should be combined with and 
numbered as UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001; and, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-708 
should be combined with and numbered as UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-1001, as 
follows: 
[19 9 198/11 ~1198, Qisk>iet eeYiA Pe¥ie""'' ef "he8PEI ef aEijastme&t 
EleeisieRa 
(1) Any person adversely affeeted lly any deeisien of a heard of adjust 
meat may petitien the distriet eeurt fer a review of the deeisien. 
(2) In the petitien, the plaintiff may only allege that the heard of 
adjustment's deeisien 'NBS ar"hitraey, eapFieieus, OF illegal. 
OJ The petition is haFFed unless it is filed within >!(). days after the 
hoard of adjustment's deeisien is final. 
(4)(a) The heard of adjustment shall transmit to the revie•o'ling eeurt the 
reeerd ef its preeeedings inelu ding its minutes, findings, erdeFs and, if 
available, a true and eeFFeet transeFipt of its pFeeeedings. 
(h) If the pFeeeeding was tape Feeerded, a transeript of that tape re 
eerding is a true and eeFFeet transeript faT pul'}3eSeA of this suhseetion. 
(a)(a)(i) If theTe is a TeeoTd, the distTiet eourt's Teview .ffi-ffi:nited to the 
Teeerd pro•rided hy the hoaFd of adjustment. 
(ii) The eourt may net aeeept or eonsideT any evidenee outside the 
hoard ef adjustment's reeeTd unless that evidenee was effuTed to the hoaTd 
of adjustment and the eouTt determines that it was improperly exeused hy 
the heard ef adjustment. 
(h) If there is ne reeerd, the eourt may eall witnesses and talw evi 
~ 
(G) The eeurt shall affum the deeiffien ef the beard of adjustment if the 
deeision is supported hy substantial evidenee ie tfie reeord.-
(7)(a) The filing of a petition does net stay the deeisiml ef the board of 
adjustment. 
(h)(i) :BefeTe filing the petition, the aggrieYed paTty may petition the 
heaTd of adjustment to stay its deeision. 
(ii) Upon reeeipt ef a IJetitien to stay, tfie boaTEl ef adjuAtment may 
eTdeT its deeisien stayed pending distriet eourt review if tfie boaTEl of 
adjustment finds it to be in the best inteTest ef the munieiJ!ality. 
(iii) After the IJetitien is filed tfie fletitieeer may seel< ae injunetien 
staying the beard ef adjustment's deeisiee.] 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708 should be amended as follows: 
10-9-1001117-27-708. Appeals.* 
[(21] (1) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exer-
cise ~the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
[(.lf] (2) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land 
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made 
under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(a) In the petiti()n, the plaintiff may only allege that the board of 
adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
[(.&}] (4) The courts shall: 
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The scope of the "any decision" language makes it an im-
provement over the language of the former city enabling act, 
which provided for appeals to the courts from "any decision of 
the board of adjustment."641 The latter language was trouble-
some because it could be interpreted, as it was in Davis County 
v. Clearfield City,642 to provide that appeals to the courts 
could be taken only from decisions of a board of adjustment. 
Thus, the court of appeals viewed the Clearfield City zoning 
ordinance, which fixed the city council, and not the board of 
adjustments, as the appellate body for conditional uses, as con-
trary to the enabling act then in force. According to the court of 
appeals, "[ w ]here a route of review is provided by a state stat-
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(h) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
(5) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
(6)(a) The hoard of adjustment shall transmit to the reviewing court the 
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape re-
cording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection. 
(7)(a)(i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the board of adjustment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the 
board of adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the board 
of adjustment and the court determines that it was improperly excluded 
by the board of adjustment. 
(h) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evi-
dence. 
(8)(a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the board of 
adjustment. 
(b)(i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party may petition the 
board of adjustment to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may 
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of 
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After the petition is filed the petitioner may seek an injunction 
staying the board of adjustment's decision. 
(*All of the provisions of§§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708 are moved unchanged into the 
section above, except for subsections (1) and (3) of §§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708, 
which are deleted.) 
641. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). In 
relation to the present enabling acts, compare id. §§ 10-9-708(1) (1992), 17-27-
708(1) (1991) ("[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjust-
ment") with id. §§ 10-9-1001(2), 17-27-1001(2) ("[a]ny person adversely affected by 
any decision"). 
642. 7fi6 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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ute, a municipality lacks the power to alter that scheme."643 
Moreover, the Clearfield City zoning ordinance (allowing ap-
peals from a board of adjustment or a city council) was invalid 
because it "fail[ed] to provide for final review of zoning matters 
by a board of adjustment ... and endeavor[ed] to vest the City 
Council with the final determination of conditional use per-
mits."644 
B. "Any Person Adversely Affected" 
The city and county enabling acts provide that "any person 
adversely affected" by any decision may appeal to the 
courts.645 This language does not appear any different in sub-
stance from the language of the former enabling acts which 
allowed "any person aggrieved" to appeal to the courts. 646 In 
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co.,647 the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals,648 a 1953 
Connecticut decision, to explain when a person is aggrieved 
within the meaning of the former enabling acts: 
Any landowner or resident within [the] city whose situa-
tion is such that [a] decision of [the] planning board may 
adversely affect him in [the] use of property owned or occu-
pied by him in some manner within [the] scope or purposes of 
the zoning ordinance would be "aggrieved" within [the] stat-
ute giving any person aggrieved [a] right of appeal from [_the] 
board's decisio,.649 
C. Scope of Appeal 
On appeal, the scope of the remedy in cities and counties is 
that the district court may "determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."650 The acts pro-
643. !d. at 707. 
644. !d. at 708. For a dis<:ussion of the correct remedy to be followed by a 
plaintiff where the structure of administrative appeals violates the enabling acts, 
see discussion infra part VII.G.2. 
645. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
646. !d. §§ 10-9-9(1), 17-27-16 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). 
647. 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964). 
648. 98 A.2d 515 (Conn. 1953). 
649. !d. at 581, quoted in Lund, 392 P.2d at 42. 
650. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(3)(b) (1992), 17-27-1001(3)(b) (1991). 
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vide that "[t]he courts shall ... presume that land use deci-
sions and regulations are valid."651 This language appears to 
be a legislative reaffirmation of the decision of the Utah Su-
preme Court in Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
City.Bsz 
The earlier city enabling act allowed the appealing party "a 
plenary action for relief."653 Mr. Xanthos, who had been re-
fused a variance, persuaded the trial judge that this language 
permitted him a trial de novo in relation to which "the court 
has the same power as the board of adjustment to review the 
facts."654 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and reversed 
the trial court, holding that "the role of the district court in re-
viewing the Board of Adjustment's decision is to determine 
whether the action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbi-
trary and capricious."655 The court held that "it was not [the 
trial court judge's] prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. His 
role was limited to determining whether there was evidence in 
the record to support the Board of Adjustment's action."656 
D. Procedure 
A zoning appeal is made by filing "a petition for review of 
the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered."657 The enabling acts provide that 
"[d]ecisions of the board of adjustment become effective at the 
meeting in which the decision is made, unless a different time 
is designated in the board's rules or at the time the decision is 
made."658 In relation to zoning appeals, it has been held that 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act659 "applies only to 
state and not to local agencies."660 
E. Administrative Remedies 
Although "any decision" may be appealed to the courts, the 
city and county acts explicitly provide that decisions cannot be 
651. !d. §§ 10-9-1001(3)(a), 17-27-1001(3)(a). 
652. 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
653. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
654. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1033. 
655. !d. at 1034-35. 
656. ld. at 1035. 
657. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) {1991). 
658. ld. §§ 10-9-702(6) (1992), 17-27-702(6) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). 
659. !d. §§ 63-46b-1 to -22 (Supp. 1994). 
660. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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challenged in the courts "until [the appellant] has exhausted 
his administrative remedies."661 In this context, the adminis-
trative remedy referred to is an administrative appeal to the 
board of adjustment, unless another body is designated for that 
purpose.662 
In earlier years, the rule of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies was not consistently applied or stated in the absolute 
terms that it is described above. For example, in Smith v. 
Barrett,663 a plaintiff who was denied a building permit by 
the Logan city commission appealed directly to the courts and 
not to the board of adjustment, without a procedural challenge. 
Similarly, in Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co.,664 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, in the alternative, the rights of an 
appellant were such that an "appeal from that administrative 
ruling [the issuance of a building permit] should have been 
taken to the proper administrative tribunal, or a suit should 
have been commenced in the courts within the statutory peri-
d ,665 0 . 
However, by at least 1979, the requirement that adminis-
trative remedies be exhausted was viewed more strictly. In 
Seal v. Mapleton City,666 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the refusal to approve a subdivision plat on substantive 
grounds noting, however, that "this matter could properly have 
been disposed of on procedural grounds [inter alia, failure to 
exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to the board of 
adjustment]."667 Thereafter, in three cases, appeals to the 
courts were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. In Levie v. Sevier County,668 a subdivision plat was 
rejected by the county commission, and the landowner respond-
ed by appealing directly to the courts. Citing its decisions in 
Lund and Seal, thA Utah Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of 
the complaint on the grounds that "[t]his Court has previously 
661. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(1) (1992); see also id. § 17-27-1001(1) 
(1991). 
662. !d. §§ 10-9-704 (1992), 17-27-704 (Supp. 1994). 
663. 20 P.2d 864 (Utah 1933). 
664. 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964). 
665. !d. at 42 (emphasis added). 
666. 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). 
667. Id. at 1347. 
668. 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980). 
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held that administrative remedies must first be exhausted 
before mandamus willlie."669 
In Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning 
Commission,670 the petitioner appealed the refusal of the 
planning commission to issue a building permit directly to the 
courts and not to the board of adjustment. The response of the 
Utah Supreme Court was to dismiss the petitioner's mandamus 
claim on the grounds that he had failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedy of appeal to the board of adjustment.671 The 
result was the same in Hatch v. Utah County Planning Depart-
ment,672 in which Utah's high court, citing Merrihew, dis-
missed the plaintiff's claim for an extraordinary writ because 
he failed to appeal the refusal to grant a building permit to the 
board of adjustment.673 
F. Record on Appeal 
As noted above, the role of a district court in a zoning 
appeal is to determine whether there is "evidence in the record" 
to support the administrative decision below.674 Thus, the ex-
istence of an adequate administrative record is critical. Howev-
er, the only statutory requirements with respect to the admin-
istrative record are that a board of adjustment is required to 
keep minutes showing the vote of its members and "records of 
its examinations and other official actions."675 In addition, the 
board "may, but is not required to, have its proceedings con-
temporaneously transcribed by a court reporter or a tape re-
corder [sic]."676 
There is, accordingly, no guarantee that the administrative 
record will be adequate, and thus the decision in Xanthos fo-
cused, inter alia, on the course to be followed if it is not. The 
Xanthos court referred to an administrative hearing it had re-
viewed in Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Central Weber 
669. !d. at 3a2. 
670. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983). 
671. !d. ai 1067. 
672. 681i P.2d 550 (Utah 1984). 
673. !d. ai 5/il. 
674. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 
(Utah 1984). 
675. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-702(4)(b)(ii) (1992), 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii) (Supp. 
1994). 
676. !d. §§ 10-9-702(4)(c), 17-27 -702(4)(c). 
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Sewer Improvement District,677 wherein it stated, "where 
there was nothing to review, the reviewing court must be al-
lowed to get at the facts."678 The Xanthos court noted that in 
the instant case there was no record of the proceedings before 
the board of adjustment and consequently permitted the follow-
ing alternative: 
Since there is no record of the proceedings, due process would 
be denied if the district court could not get at the facts. 
Therefore, the court must be allowed to take its own evidence 
and need not necessarily be limited to the evidence presented 
before the Board of Adjustment. This does not mean that the 
hearing in the district court should be a retrial on the merits, 
or that the district court can substitute its judgment for that 
of the Board. 679 
In Davis County v. Clearfield City,680 although presented 
with an "extensive" record, the trial court nevertheless received 
additional testimony. The court was concemed about both a 
"secretive" and unreported "pre-meeting'' of the city council, 
and the refusal of the planning commission to support its deci-
sion with formal findings. 681 The court of appeals found no 
conflict with the holding in Xanthos, and observed in a foot-
note: 
We note that in taking additional evidence and making its 
detailed findings, the trial court made a fair and disciplined 
effort to understand the basis for the city's decision. In no 
sense did it venture beyond its role as the court was said to 
have done in Xanthos and decide the case "according to lits] 
notion of what was in the best interests of the citizens" of 
Clearfield City.682 
677. 287 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955). 
678. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. 
679. ld. at 1034. 
680. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
681. !d. at 709-10. 
682. !d. at 710 n.7; see also Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 
486 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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G. Extraordinary Relief (Mandamus) 
1. Petition for review 
95 
Historically it has been common for plaintiffs to "appeal" 
administrative zoning decisions to the courts by petitioning for 
issuance of a writ of mandamus,683 but it is now clear that 
the correct remedy is the filing of a petition for review. Thus, 
both enabling acts require that the remedy for "any person 
adversely affected by any decision" made in the exercise of 
provisions of the enabling acts is "a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court."684 
The requirement that a petition for review, and not a writ 
of mandamus, is the proper remedy on appeal is a statutory 
reaffirmation of the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Crist v. Mapleton City. 685 In that case, the city council and 
the board of adjustment both refused to authorize a building 
permit, and the plaintiff responded by filing a petition for a 
writ of mandamus in the district court. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that the enabling act then in force per-
mitted an appeal from the administrative decision in the form 
of "a plenary action for relief,"686 which action for relief the 
plaintiff had ignored. The consequence, the court held, was 
that, 
By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, 
the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordi-
nary writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is not a substi-
tute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve the 
purpose of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error.687 
2. Proper use of mandamus 
There may be instances where extraordinary relief in the 
form of a writ of mandamus may be used. For example, in 
Davis County v. Clearfield City,688 the zoning ordinance im-
properly permitted the city council to hear appeals relating to 
the grant or denial of a conditional use permit. The result was 
683. For examples of this practice, see discussion supra part V.I.l. 
684. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991). 
685. 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). 
686. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991). 
687. Crist, 497 P.2d at 634. 
688. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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that the applicant could no longer appeal from "any decision of 
the board of adjustment"689 as the former enabling statute 
contemplated. Under these facts, the courts approved the plain-
tiffs use of "extraordinary relief" pursuant to Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Clearfield City cannot be heard to complain about the 
inappropriateness of the county's choice of procedure for ob-
taining judicial review [Rule 65B] in light of its own, flawed 
conditional use permit procedures. Simply put, Clearfield City 
imposed on the county a procedure inconsistent with that 
envisioned in the enabling act. Having done so, it cannot 
insist on the method of district court review envisioned in 
that act. 690 
The Clearfield City scenario repeated itself in Salt Lake 
County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City,691 in 
which the city council (operating under the optional council-
mayor form of government) violated separation of powers re-
quirements by appointing itself to hear conditional use permit 
appeals. Because the administrative process was flawed, the 
case proceeded without objection as a claim for extraordinary 
relief.692 
H. Interpretation 
A final matter faced by the courts is the interpretation of 
words or phrases from local zoning ordinances. The judiciary in 
these decisions has held that words in a zoning ordinance 
should be interpreted by giving them their common mean-
ing.693 Words or phrases which the courts have interpreted 
include the following: "public semi-public buildings,"694 "occu-
pied trailer house or mobile home,"695 "feed lot,'*'96 and 
"school."697 
689. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (195::1) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). 
690. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 708. 
691. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
692. ld. at 1380. 
693. Clinton City v. Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967). 
694. Provo City v. Claudio, 63 P.2d 570, 573 (Utah 1936). 
695. Salem City v. Farnsworth, 75::1 P.2d 514, 515 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (em-
phasis added). 
696. Patterson, 433 P.2d at 9. 
697. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Senate floor debates indicate that the legislature correct-
ly interpreted our case law .... "698 
A. Accomplishments of the Enabling Acts 
97 
Adoption by the legislature of the Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act and the County Land Use 
Development and Management Act was a major step forward. 
Adoption of these acts accomplished at least the following: ( 1) 
the former enabling statutes were comprehensively reorganized 
and placed in a logical order; (2) the enabling statutes for cities 
and counties were placed in similar language and format; and, 
(3) many (but certainly not all) obsolete provisions of the previ-
ous enabling acts were eliminated. 699 
B. Proposals for Legislative Change 
However, some flaws exist in the new acts, many of which 
were simply carried from the old enabling statutes into the new 
enabling statutes. Whatever their origin, these flaws-which 
have been described throughout this article under the heading 
of Proposed Legislative Change-should be corrected. In sum-
mary form, the enabling acts should be amended to incorporate 
the following sixteen proposals: ( 1) a planning commission is 
required700 ; (2) a county zoning ordinance may determine the 
number and terms of planning commission members 701 ; (3) 
the term of office for a county planning commission chair is not 
limited to one year702; (4) a general plan must be adopted be-
fore a zoning ordinance is adopted703; (5) a planning commis-
sion must hold hearings on the zoning ordinance it will propose 
to the legislative body70\ (6) initiatives and referenda705 
698. Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1122 n.2 (Utah 
1994). 
699. For example, the obsolete "official map" was eliminated. See supra text 
accompanying note 355. 
700. See discussion supra part II.A. 
701. See discussion supra part II.B. 
702. See discussion supra part II.C. 
703. See discussion supra part II.E.l. 
704. See discussion supra part III.E. 
705. The provisions on initiatives and referenda are located in Title 20, Chap-
ter 11 of the Utah Cude and are technically not part of the enabling acts. See 
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may be used to rezone where (i) the change is a material 
change in zoning policy, (ii) the complexity of the proposal is 
such that the average voter can easily understand it, and (iii) 
the voting process will not unreasonably interfere with the ef-
ficient operation of the government body; and, (7) a "conditional 
use permit" is defined as a type of "special exception."706 
In addition, (8) temporary zoning regulations may be 
adopted without obtaining the recommendation of the planning 
commission707; (9) divisions of land for commercial, manu-
facturing, or industrial purposes, or into relatively small par-
cels for agricultural purposes, should be made subject to the 
county subdivision ordinance708; (10) a county board of adjust-
ment should have five members709; (11) members of a city 
board of adjustment should serve a length of term prescribed in 
the zoning ordinance710; (12) a county board of adjustment 
should be entitled to interpret the zoning maps without special 
authorization in the zoning ordinance711 ; (13) the time to ap-
peal to a board of adjustment should be ten days unless the 
zoning ordinance provides otherwise712; (14) action by a coun-
ty board of adjustment to reverse an administrative decision 
should require the affirmative vote of three out of five mem-
bers713; (15) unless the legislative body otherwise provides, 
the board of adjustment should have jurisdiction to hear (i) 
zoning appeals, (ii) special exceptions (including conditional use 
permits), (iii) nonconforming use issues, and, (iv) the board of 
adjustment should have exclusive jurisdiction to grant varianc-
es 714; and, (16) duplicative provisions describing appeals to 
the courts should be combined and reconciled. 715 
generally discussion supra part III.F. 
706. See discussion supra part III.H. 
707. See discussion supra part III.J. 
708. See discussion supra part IV.A. 
709. See discussion supra part VI.A. 
710. See discussion supra part VI.A. 
711. See discussion supra part VI.F. 
712. See discussion supra part VI.F. 
713. See discussion supra part VI.F. 
714. See discussion supra part VI.I-J. 
715. See discussion supra part VILA. 
